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ABSTRACT
The accounting profession as a whole has been re­
ceiving more and more attention from several sectors of the 
business environment, including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the government. This attention has been 
directed toward a study of the accounting practices of pub­
licly owned corporations and their auditors by the United 
States Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage­
ment. This study and other inquiries into the practices of 
the accounting profession are indicative of the need for 
the accounting profession to consider possible areas of self 
regulation. The area which is being explored here is the 
selection, rotation and retention of independent auditors. 
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are threefold:
(1) to examine the advantages and disadvantages of the rota­
tion of auditors, (2) to survey accountants in public prac­
tice and controllers in industry for their opinions on a 
policy of rotation of auditors, and (3) to examine the re­
sults of the survey and determine whether or not the account­
ing profession should adopt a policy which requires rotation 
of auditors.
This study began by examining the advantages and 
disadvantages of rotation of auditors through a study of
viii
material previously published, thereby accomplishing objec­
tive one. The advantages of rotation which were discussed 
include the maintenance of independence, the securing of a 
fresh point of view and the possible reduction of litiga­
tion =<gainst accountants. The disadvantages, which were 
discussed, include the loss of large clients by CPA firms, 
the adverse effects of installing new auditors, the experi­
ence and information loss from previous audits, and the 
disruption of types of services offered to the client.
A questionnaire was sent to practicing accountants 
and controllers for their opinions, thereby accomplishing 
the second objective. The questionnaire, which explored the 
practices of selecting, rotating, and retaining independent 
auditors, was sent to the controllers of the Fortune 500 
companies and to a select group of CPA firms. The CPA 
firms included the firms in the group known as the "Big 8" 
and "Big 7" firms. Responses from the controllers totaled 
339, for a 67.8% response rate. Responses from the CPA 
firms totaled 10, for a 66.67% response rate. A policy of 
automatically changing independent auditing firms on a rou­
tine basis was not favored by 322 of the controller respond­
ents (96.12%). The CPA respondents who did not feel that 
the future would hold a policy of compulsory rotation of 
CPA firms among clients totaled 8 (80%).
The results of the survey in this study indicated 
that the accounting profession and the business sector do 
not favor any changes in the policies governing the
selection, rotation and retention of independent auditors. 
However, this writer feels that it would be better for the 
accounting profession to implement a policy of rotation of 
auditing firms among clients voluntarily rather than have 
such a policy imposed upon the profession by an outside 
agency, be it the United States Congress or the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The accounting profession as a whole has been re­
ceiving more and more attention from several sectors of the 
business environment, including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the government. This attention has been 
directed toward a study of the accounting practices of 
publicly owned corporations and their auditors by the United 
States Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage­
ment. The results of this study, known as The Accounting 
Establishment, and other inquiries into the practices of 
the accounting profession are indicative of the need for the 
accounting profession to consider possible areas of self 
regulation. The area which is being explored here is the 
selection, rotation and retention of independent auditors.
Reliance of Businesses on Accountants 
For years the accounting profession has been grow­
ing at a rapid pace. The amount of work carried out by 
accounting firms has increased significantly over the past 
ten years. As businesses grow from small concerns to multi­
level organizations, their need for competent accountants 
grows also. Once a business firm establishes a working
1
2relationship with a competent accounting firm, the tendency 
is for that business to continue the good relationship as 
long as possible. Accountants also lean toward maintaining 
the relationship with good, longstanding clients.
On the surface, there is nothing wrong with the 
building up and maintaining of good, successful business 
relationships between clients and accountants. However, 
over a period of time, it may become evident that manage­
ment is exercising some influence over the independent 
accountant's audit procedure. This might tend to reduce 
the auditor's degree of independence and his objectivity.
Company Formation of an Audit Committee
An accountant is generally engaged to examine the 
financial statements of a company and issue an objective 
opinion on those statements. The board of directors of any 
company places heavy emphasis on the statements and accom­
panying opinion of the outside auditor. As the directors 
of the company receive more pressure from the company stock­
holders to examine management's activities and safeguard 
the company assets, the board of directors in turn looks to 
the outside, independent auditor for help in examining the 
financial statements and consequently, the activities of 
management.
To enable the board of directors to better under­
stand the function of an independent outside auditor and 
the work which he performs for the company, many companies
3have established what is known as an audit committee. Audit 
committees help directors of a company to examine closely 
the audit function and to understand the importance of an 
independent audit. Directors become more aware of the dif­
ference between management, which operates the business, and 
the board of directors, which checks on management and 
determines broad policy.
The use of an audit committee to better serve the 
interests of companies and their stockholders has received 
considerable attention. In January of 1977, the New York 
Stock Exchange issued an "Audit Committee Policy Statement" 
in which a definite date was set for the formulation of an 
audit committee by each domestic company listing common 
shares of stock on the New York Stock Exchange. The audit 
committee must be formed no later than June 30, 1978 .'*'
Audit committees mainly do two things. The first 
responsibility is to examine the outside auditor's manage­
ment letter. The second responsibility is to appoint the 
independent auditor for the firm. New members of audit com­
mittees frequently find that once this second responsibility 
is carried out, there is opposition to changing the appointed 
outside auditor. The question arises as to why this should 
be the case. Do companies want long, continuing management-
"*"R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann, Corporate Audit 
Committees: Policies and Practices (Altamonte Springs,
Florida: The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc., 1977),
p. 19.
4auditor relationships in order to influence the auditor?
Or are companies opposed to changing auditors for other 
2
reasons?
The interests of the stockholders, which the board
of directors is elected to protect, is best served by the
examination of the statements by a completely independent
auditor. Some companies are therefore considering the
question of adopting a policy of rotating the Certified
Public Accounting firms which serve them as independent 
3
auditors. Such a policy could affect the accounting pro­
fession considerably. Rather than leaving the adoption of 
such a policy to industry, which auditors serve, it would 
appear to be better to have the accounting profession 
investigate the need for the rotation of auditors.
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA 
The American Institute of Certified Public Account­
ants has addressed itself to the problem of improving the 
practice of accounting before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. In September of 1977, the Council of the AICPA 
adopted a resolution which established a new division of 
the AICPA. The division is composed of a "SEC Practice Sec­
tion" and a "Private Companies Practice Section." Both of 
these sections have similar objectives.
2
Robert K. Mautz, "Rotation of Auditors," Financial 
Executive, Vol. 42 (July, 1974), pp. 48-49.
^Ibid.
5The SEC Practice Section has set forth the follow­
ing four objectives:
1. Improve the quality of practice by CPA firms 
before the SEC through the establishment of 
practice requirements for member firms.
2. Establish and maintain an effective system of 
self-regulation of member firms by means of 
mandatory peer reviews, required maintenance 
of appropriate quality controls and the im­
position of sanctions for failure to meet 
membership requirements.
3. Enhance the effectiveness of the section's 
regulatory system through the monitoring and
valuation activities of an independent over­
sight board composed of public members.
4. Provide a forum for development of technical 
information relating to SEC practice.4
Several requirements for membership of CPA firms in
the SEC practice division were set forth by the AICPA. The 
following requirement ties in closely with the second ob­
jective stated above which calls for an effective system of 
self-regulation:
Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of 
each SEC engagement which has had another audit 
partner in charge for a period of five consecutive 
years and prohibit such incumbent partner from re­
turning to in charge status on the engagement for 
a minimum of two years. . . .5
This requirement establishes a policy of mandatory rotation 
of the audit partners which is one step toward a form of
self-regulation. However, it is possible that the account­
ing profession should go further in the area of
4
"The AICPA Division of CPA Firms," The Journal of 
Accountancy, Vol. 144 (November, 1977), p. 113.
^Ibid.
6self-regulation. The profession should examine whether or 
not the rotation of auditors, that is, audit firms, should 
be adopted within the accounting profession as a whole.
The Nature of the Problem
The overall problem of this study is to determine 
whether or not a policy of rotation of auditors should be 
considered by the accounting profession as a whole. The 
questions which immediately arise are primarily the follow­
ing :
1. What are the advantages of rotating auditors?
2. What are the disadvantages of rotating audi­
tors?
These two areas are explored and discussed through a review 
of the professional literature. In addition, a question­
naire, to be explained later, presents the opinions of con­
trollers and CPAs regarding the selection, rotation and re­
tention of independent auditors.
If some companies feel that accountants are compro­
mising their professional standing by maintaining long­
standing relationships with clients, then it is necessary 
to look at a way to re-establish the outside auditor as a 
completely independent examiner of financial statements.
The Scope of This Study
This study is oriented toward the accounting pro­
fession as a whole within the United States. Practical
7considerations necessitated the restrictions placed on the 
scope of this study.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited to gathering the opinions of 
the controllers of the five hundred largest industrial 
companies in the United States and a select group of CPA 
firms. In order to determine whether or not there should 
be a policy regarding rotation of auditors, it is necessary 
to question those persons in industry who deal with audi­
tors as well as the auditors themselves.
The field of empirical research has been limited to 
the controllers of the five hundred largest industrial 
companies on the basis that they represent the largest 
businesses in the United States. In addition, it is their 
close associations with independent accountants which give 
rise to concern by third parties over their possible influ­
ence over independent auditors. These five hundred com­
panies collectively are in a good position to exert influ­
ence from the business sector over the general practices 
and procedures of the accounting profession as a whole. A 
previous study of auditor changes done by John C. Burton 
and William Roberts explained their use of the Fortune's 
500 list as follows:
Fortune's 500 list was used because it included 
the bulk of the unregulated large corporations 
which require auditor's opinions. We felt that 
large firms were crucial in considering the public
8interest associated with the attest function, both 
because they control a substantial proportion of 
the country's resources and because their economic 
power over public accounting firms is potentially 
the greatest.^
The second group of opinions is gathered from a 
small group of CPA firms known as the "Big 8" and the "Big
7." According to the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting and Management, the "Big 8" firms are very 
powerful and influential. The "Big 7" are also important 
but not nearly as large. The report of the subcommittee 
stated the following:
These eight firms are so big and influential in 
relation to other accounting firms that they domi­
nate the practice of accounting in the United States 
and probably throughout the world.
The influence exercised by the "Big 8" firms 
far exceeds that which might be expected from the 
number of CPAs working for them. Only about 11 or 
12 percent of the nation's estimated 160,000 CPAs 
are associated with "Big 8" firms, but their influ­
ence is magnified because their clients are the 
largest and wealthiest corporations in the United 
States. Because of their large size, the "Big 8" 
firms exercise substantial influence directly on 
accounting practices promulgated or approved by the 
Federal Government. They also exercise substantial 
indirect influence through the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which they 
control, and through the accounting practices fol­
lowed by their corporate clients.?
g
John C. Burton and William Roberts, "A Study of 
Auditor Changes," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 123 
(April, 1967), p. 32.
7
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government 
Operations, The Accounting Establishment: A Staff Report,
S. Doc. No. 95-34, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977 (Wash­
ington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 4-5
9In selecting the controllers of the five hundred 
largest industrial companies and the "Big 8" and "Big 7" 
firms, the results of the survey reflect the opinions of 
the persons who use the largest auditing firms as well as 
the opinions of those who perform the work. Of the 500 
companies surveyed, 4 95 or 99% of them are audited by the 
"Big 8" and the "Big 7" CPA firms.
Limitations of a Questionnaire 
The questionnaire distributed in this study is sub­
ject of the limitations inherent in the questionnaire 
technique. Such limits include the interpretation of 
questions differently by respondents, the confusion over 
terminology used and the possible result of a poor response 
rate. The advantages of a questionnaire are twofold. It 
allows a researchers to contact persons over a large geo­
graphical area. In addition, the questionnaire allows a 
respondent to reply to the questions at his own conveni­
ence .
Objectives of This Study 
The objectives of this study are threefold:
1. To examine the advantages and disadvantages 
of the rotation of auditors.
2. To survey accountants in public practice and 
controllers in industry for their opinions 
on a policy of rotation of auditors, and
10
3. To examine the results of the survey and 
determine whether or not the accounting 
profession should adopt a policy which re­
quires rotation of auditors.
The accounting profession is constantly growing 
and changing, as is the overall size of industry. As a 
result of the increasing size of business and the greater 
need for audits performed by certified public accountants, 
the pressures felt by accountants have increased. It may 
therefore be necessary to consider the adoption of a 
policy within the accounting profession regarding the rota­
tion of auditors among companies. This study is aimed at 
helping the accounting profession decide whether a policy 
of rotation of auditors is needed.
Research Methodology 
This study begins to look at the subject of rota­
tion of auditors by examining the advantages and disad­
vantages of such a policy. By studying the advantages and 
disadvantages, a more thorough understanding of what such
a policy means was made clear. This first objective was
> •
accomplished by examining material already published. The 
results of this research are presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
In preparation for achieving the second objective 
of surveying accountants and controllers for their opinions, 
a questionnaire was formulated for each group which ex­
plored the practices of selecting, rotating, and retaining
11
independent auditors. In addition, the questionnaires 
asked for opinions as to whether a policy of rotation of 
auditors should be adopted by the accounting profession.
The questionnaires were submitted to the controllers of 
the Fortune 500 companies and to a select group of CPA 
firms to obtain their opinions. The questionnaires along 
with the transmittal letters are presented in Appendix A.
The questionnaire for the controllers was sent to 
each of the controllers of the companies included in the 
Fortune's 500 grouping. A list of these companies is pre­
sented in Appendix B. The questionnaire was mailed 
March 1, 1978. All useable responses received on or before 
March 31, 1978, were included in the results which were 
processed by a computer program. The total responses were 
339; the response rate was 67.8%. Of these 339 responses, 
335 were useable. Four respondents stated an inability to 
participate in the survey.
The questionnaire for the CPA firms was sent to a 
partner in charge in the home office of each of the "Big 
8" and "Big 7" firms. The firms in the "Big 8" grouping 
are as follows:
Arthur Andersen and Company 
Arthur Young and Company 
Coopers and Lybrand 
Ernst and Ernst 
Haskins and Sells
Peat, Marwick and Mitchell and Company
12
Price Waterhouse 
Touche Ross and Company.
The firms that compose the "Big 7" group are as follows: 
Alexander Grant and Company 
Hurdman and Cranstoun 
J. K. Lasser and Company 
Laventhol and Horwath
S. D. Leidesdorf and Company 
Main Lafrentz and Company 
Seidman and Seidman.
The questionnaire was mailed March 10, 1978. A follow-up 
questionnaire was mailed April 24, 1978. All useable 
responses received on or before May 24, 1978, were included 
in the results which were tabulated by the researcher. The 
total responses were 10; the response rate was 66.67%. The 
results of both questionnaires are presented in Chapter 4.
Preview to This Study 
In Chapter 2 the various advantages of a policy of 
rotating auditors are discussed. The disadvantages of a 
policy of rotating auditors are discussed in Chapter 3. A 
questionnaire exploring the selection, rotation and reten­
tion of independent auditors was submitted to both indus­
trial firms and CPA firms. The results of these question­
naires are presented in Chapter 4. Summary and concluding 
remarks are presented in Chapter 5. Appendix A contains
the questionnaires and transmittal letters. Appendix B 
contains the list of the Fortune 500 companies to which 
the questionnaire for the controllers was sent.
Chapter 2
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE ROTATION 
OF AUDITORS
When considering a policy such as rotation of audi­
tors, it is necessary to understand, discuss, and question 
the advantages and disadvantages of such a policy. In 
this chapter, the advantages of rotation of auditors will 
be explored. What exactly would be considered the benefits
of a policy of rotation of auditors?
The advantages of a policy of rotation of auditors 
are as follows:
1. Maintenance of independence,
2. Presenting the client with a fresh point of
view, and
3. Possibly reducing litigation against account­
ants .
Each of these advantages is discussed in this chapter.
Maintaining Independente
The first and most often discussed advantage of 
rotating auditors is the maintenance of independence. Not 
only the maintaining of independence, but the strengthening 
of independence is viewed as a primary benefit of rotation
14
15
of auditors. Why is this so? Why is independence so im­
portant?
Independence is considered to be the cornerstrone 
of the accounting profession. The reason is that people, 
that is, third parties, look to accountants to issue 
opinions that are fair and unbiased with regard to the 
financial statements of a company. Accountants, specific­
ally auditors, cannot do that unless they are independent.
What Does It Mean to be Independent?
Webster's Dictionary defines independence as "the 
quality or state of being independent" and independence as 
"not subject to control by others; self-governing."^ How 
do others view independence?
Independence as Viewed by the AICPA
The American Institute of Certified Public Account­
ants has issued a Code of Professional Ethics which guides 
certified public accountants in their professional conduct. 
The Code of Professional Ethics helps accountants to govern 
themselves. The AICPA has an Auditing Standards Executive 
Committee which issues Statements on Auditing Standards. 
These auditing standards are adhered to by certified public 
accountants. The AICPA1s primary set of standards are known
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 
(Springfield, Mass: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1963), p. 426.
16
as generally accepted auditing standards and are composed 
of general standards, standards of field work and stand­
ards of reporting. Of the general standards, the second 
one is perhaps the most important. It is as follows:
In all matters relating to the assignment, 
an independence in mental attitude is to be main­
tained by the auditor or auditors.2
The AICPA does on to describe what is meant by this general
standard on independence.
This standard requires that the auditor be 
independent, aside from being in public practice 
(as distinct from being in private practice), he 
must be without bias with respect to the client 
under audit, since otherwise he would lack that 
impartiality necessary for the dependability of 
his findings, however excellent his technical 
proficiency may be. However, independence does 
not imply the attitude of a prosecutor but rather 
a judicial impartiality that recognizes an obliga­
tion for fairness not only to management and owners 
of a business but also to creditors and those who 
may otherwise rely (in part, at least) upon the 
independent auditor's report, as in the case of 
prospective owners or creditors.^
The discussion of this standard continues by emphasizing the 
need for the public to remain confident in the auditor's 
independence. The profession's code of ethics contains 
precepts which guard against any assumption of the loss of 
independence by an auditor. Basically, the AICPA views in­
dependence in the following manner:
2
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
Statement on Auditing Standards: Codification of Auditing
Standards and Procedures (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1973), p. 5.
^Ibid., pp. 8-9.
17
To be independent, the auditor must be in­
tellectually honest; to be recognized as inde­
pendent, he must be free from any obligation 
to or interest in the client, its management, 
or its owners. . . . Independent auditors 
should not only be independent in fact; they 
should avoid situations that may lead outsiders 
to doubt their independence.4
Having reviewed the AICPA standard regarding inde­
pendence, it is useful to look at other meanings and inter­
pretations of independence as it relates to accountants in 
order to understand more fully why accountants place so 
much importance on this one facet of professional conduct.
Independence as Viewed by Third Parties
It is interesting to take an historical look at how 
the public--that is, third parties— have perceived account­
ants and independence over the years. Third parties are 
defined, for the purposes of this discussion, as those 
people who are "providing or using relevant, timely and 
verifiable information which is free from bias, but who are
not acting as spokesman for the AICPA or the Securities and
5Exchange Commission."
The viewpoint of third parties can be segmented into 
three periods of time. The first era is the pre-World War I 
time period. During this period, detection of fruad was the 
primary purpose of the nineteenth century auditor.
^Ibid.
5
Robert E. Schlosser, "An Historical Approach to 
the Concept of Independence," The New York Certified Public 
Accountant, Vol. 39 (July, 1969), p. 522.
18
Independence was conceived as denoting "disinterestedness" 
or "outsiderness." This was all that was necessary to 
detect fraud. In the early 1900's, the idea of independ­
ence in fact began to develop. If an auditor was inde- 
pendent, it was necessary for him to have integrity, 
honesty, and freedom to express his opinion when certify­
ing a company's financial statements. Without the integ­
rity and honesty, the presence of independence meant 
nothing to third parties.^
The second era of the public viewpoint of independ­
ence is marked by the years from World War I to the Depres­
sion. During this era the idea of independence meaning 
integrity and honesty grew. Detection of fraud was still 
considered the main purpose of an audit. However, in the 
early 1930's, an article in the Journal of Accountancy 
talked about the fact that since railroads were audited by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, it was not usual for 
them to use independent audits. However, the underlying 
idea expressed in the article was that an auditor's inde­
pendence guaranteed honesty and integrity which was needed 
to make audits of value and full compliance was supported.
Independence is now developed to mean having integrity and
7
honesty, not only "disinterestedness."
^Ibid., pp. 522-523.
7Ibid.
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The third era takes up the period of the Post 
Depression years. There were two significant developments 
which occurred in the early 1930's. First, the Securities 
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 stated re­
quirements for independent auditors. Second, the New York 
Stock Exchange called for independent audits of all com­
panies listed on the exchange. These two events put new 
pressures on public accountants. They now had to compose 
generally accepted accounting principles to which the New 
York Stock Exchange companies should conform. Here the con­
cept of independence for an auditor takes on the aspect of
someone who can objectively apply accounting principles as
8  *
well as detect fraud.
With the formulation of the generally accepted 
accounting principles, the auditor now is responsible for 
passing judgment on the application of principles to a 
company's statements. This can be called the "objective 
judgment" criteria of independence. Independence now means 
having the ability and willingness to be objective in 
passing judgment on the satisfactory application of gener­
ally accepted accounting principles, besides being honest 
and having integrity. The "objective judgment" criteria of 
independence which developed during the Post Depression
O
Ibid., p. 524.
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years is very close to the concept of independence as a
g
"state of mind" which is widely held today.
Independence as Viewed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission
Regulation S-X of the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission Accounting Rules is the principal accounting regu­
lation. Within this regulation Rule 2.01 sets forth the 
Securities and Exchange Commission's formal requirements 
as to the qualifications of accountants and their independ­
ence. Rule 2.01 is as follows:
(a) The Commission will not recognize any per­
son as a certified public accountant who is not 
duly registered and in good standing as such under 
the laws of the place of his residence or princi­
pal office. The Commission will not recognize any 
person as a public accountant who is not in good 
standing and entitled to practice as such under 
the laws of the place of his residence or princi­
pal office.
(b) The Commission will not recognize any cer­
tified public accountant or public accountant as 
independent who is not in fact independent. For 
example, an accountant will be considered not in­
dependent with respect to any person or any of its 
parents, its subsidiaries, or other affiliates
(1) in which, during the period of his professional 
engagement to examine the financial statements 
being reported on or at the date of his report, he 
or his firm or a member thereof had, or was com­
mitted to acquire, any direct financial interest 
or any material indirect financial interest; (2) 
with which, during the period of his professional 
engagement to examine the financial statements 
being reported on, at the date of his report or 
during the period covered by the financial state­
ments, he or his firm or a member thereof was
9Ibid.
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connected as a promoter, underwriter, voting 
trustee, director, officer, or employee, ex­
cept that a firm will not be deemed not inde­
pendent in regard to a particular person if a 
former officer or employee of such person is 
employed by the firm and such individual has 
completely disassociated himself from the per­
son and its affiliates and does not partici­
pate in auditing financial statements of the 
person or its affiliates covering any period 
of his employment by the person. For the pur­
poses of the rule the term "member" means all 
partners in the firm and all professional 
employees participating in the audit or located 
in an office of the firm participating in a 
significant portion of the audit.
(c) In determining whether an accountant 
may in fact be not independent with respect to 
a particular person, the Commission will give 
appropriate consideration to all relevant cir­
cumstances, including evidence bearing on all 
relationships between the accountant and that 
person or any affiliate thereof, and will not 
confine itself to the relationship existing in 
connection with the filing of reports with the 
Commission.10
Over the years, beginning in 1937, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission has published advisories known as 
Accounting Series Releases. These statements deal with a 
variety of subjects which relate to the accounting regula­
tions of the SEC. Several of these releases have dealt 
specifically with independence. They are as follows:’
1. ASR 2. Independence of Accountants: Rela­
tionship to Registrant. Released May 6, 1937. 
This release stated the position of the Com­
mission that "an accountant could not be
~^SEC Accounting Rules, Topical Law Reports (New 
York: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1968), pp. 125-126.
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deemed independent if he is, or has been dur­
ing the period under review, an officer or 
director of the registrant or if he holds an 
interest in the registrant that is significant 
with respect to its total capital or his own 
personal fortune."^
2. ASR 22. Independence of Accountants: Indemni­
fication by Registrant. Released March 14,
1941. This release stated that if the account­
ant and the registrant enter into an agreement 
to indemnify the accountant against all losses 
arising out of the certification of the state­
ments, other than as a result of the account­
ant's willful misstatement or omission, then the
accountant cannot be recognized as independ-
, 12 ent.
3. ASR 37. Amendment of Rule 2.01 of Regulation 
S-X: Qualifications of Accountants Certifying
to Financial Statements Required to be Filed 
with the Commission. Released November 7, 1942. 
This release talked about disclosure of trans­
actions. It stated the following: "Perhaps
the most critical test of the actuality of an
~^Ibid., p. 3023. 
^Ibid. , p. 3049.
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accountant's independence is the strength of 
his insistence upon full disclosure of trans­
actions between the company and members of its 
management as individuals; accession to the 
wishes of the management in such cases must
inevitably raise a serious question as to whe-
13ther the accountant is in fact independent."
4. ASR 44. Amendments to Rule 2.01 of Regulation
S-X Regarding Qualifications of Accountants
Certifying to Financial Statements Required to
be Filed with the Commssion. Released May 24,
1943. This release stated that the Commission
is interested in relationships between a
registrant and a certifying accountant only to
the extent that a particular relationship might
be relevant in determining whether the account-
14ant is m  fact independent.
5. ASR 47. Independence of Certifying Accountants: 
Summary of Past Releases of the Commission and
a Compilation of Hitherto Unpublished Cases or 
Inquiries Arising Under Several of the Acts 
Administered by the Commission. Released Janu­
ary 25, 1944. This release outlined twenty
13Ibid., p. 3076.
14
Ibid., p. 3082.
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representative examples of cases where an 
accountant was considered by the Commission 
not to be independent in regard to a particu­
lar company. The examples discussed cover 
situations in which there were financial in­
vestments and transactions between the company 
and the accountant, where the accountant 
served as an officer of the company, where 
the accountant was related to the management
of the company, and where the accountant.drew
15up the monthly records of the company.
6. ASR 81. Independence of Certifying Account­
ants: Compilation of Representative Adminis­
trative Rulings in Cases Involving the Inde­
pendence of Accountants. Released December 11, 
1958. This release enumerates twenty-six 
situations in which an accountant was held not 
to be independent. It also discusses twenty 
cases where an accountant was still considered 
independent. The release also deals with ten 
examples of situations where inquiries might 
be made into the matter of an accountant's 
independence.^
15Ibid., pp. 3085-3089.
16Ibid., pp. 3236-3244.
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7. ASR 126. Independence of Accountants: Guide­
lines and Examples of Situations Involving the 
Independence of Accountants. Released July 5, 
1972. This release further sets forth the 
present guidelines by which the Commission 
determines questions concerning independence. 
The Commission states that "the concept of in­
dependence is more easily defined than 
17applied." The guidelines are therefore de­
signed to acquaint accountants with typical 
situations where there has been a loss of in­
dependence in appearance or in fact. This 
serves to point out to the accountant areas of 
potential danger to his independence.
In general, the reasoning behind any 
rule on independence is that the client, not 
the accountant, is responsible for managerial 
and decision-making functions. If the account­
ant becomes involved in these functions, then 
a relationship might develop, or appear to 
develop, which would prejudice an accountant's 
professional judgment. On the other hand, an 
accountant's job is to advise management and 
give advice on problems. At what point does
^Ibid. , p. 3363.
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advising end and managerial responsibility be­
gin? The SEC resolves this dilemma by setting 
forth this guidelines as follows:
In this context, managerial responsi­
bility begins when the accountant 
becomes, or appears to become, so 
identified ith the client's manage­
ment as t. - indistinguished from 
it. In maivrng a determination of 
whether this degree of identifica­
tion has been reached, the basic con­
sideration is whether, to a third 
party, the client appears to be 
totally dependent upon the account­
ant's skill and judgment in its finan­
cial operations or to be reliant only 
to the extent of the customary type 
of consultation or advice.18
In line with this policy, the Commission sets
out in this release several areas where it
feels that the accountant's independence will
be questioned. They are as follows:
a) EDP and Booking Services. The SEC feels that 
an accountant cannot objectively perform an 
audit on books and records which he has
kept for the client because the situation 
becomes one of the accountant evaluating and 
attesting to his own record keeping.
b) Financial Interest. There can be no finan­
cial interest involved between a client and
18
Ibid., p. 3364.
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an accountant, his wife or someone under the 
accountant's supervision. Even if the 
financial is considered indirect, a test is 
made to determine if such interest is 
material by relating the amount involved to 
the net worth of the accountant, his firm, 
and the net worth of the client.
c) Family Relationships. The Commission looks 
here at the strength of the family bond 
that exists between an accountant and the 
client. A family relationship may cause 
outside parties to question any examination 
made by the accountant.
d) Business Relationships with Clients. Any 
business relationship other than as a con­
sumer will give the accountant a problem of 
the loss of appearance of objectivity and 
impartiality in the performance of the audit. 
Such relationships appear to cause a conflict 
of interests.
e) Occupations with Conflicting Interests. The 
accountant, as an auditor, must appear to
be completely objective. If he engages in 
other activities and relationships as an 
attorney, as a broker-dealer, or as a direct 
competitor in a commercial enterprise with
28
his client, then the accountant jeopardizes 
his objectivity and independence as an audi­
tor.19
The Securities and Exchange Commission places a 
great deal of emphasis on an accountant's independence. 
Although it is hard to define independence because it is an 
intangible, it is necessary to approach the concept through 
a practical course. The SEC does this by observing an 
accountant's behavior and inferring that his behavior is 
an indication of his thoughts about independence. There­
fore, the SEC, in reviewing cases where an accountant's in­
dependence has been questioned, looks at all relevant cir­
cumstances— an accountant's relationships which would influ­
ence his actions as well as the actions themselves. The 
SEC has the difficult task of enforcing rules and regula­
tions which seek to set guides for an intangible concept—  
independence.  ^9
An Operational Concept of Independence
The concept of independence is a difficult one to 
grasp, because independence is intangible. It cannot 
readily be seen by everyone. Consequently, there has been 
much discussion about independence. Accountants must be
19
Ibid., pp. 3365-3372.
20Schlosser, "An Historical Approach to the Concept 
of Independence," p. 521.
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concerned with independence because it is a quality which 
is so essential to the accounting profession. How, then, 
can persons concerned with the independence of accountants 
reach a common understanding of the term?
One approach to determining what independence is 
is to look at independence in terms of an operational con­
cept. Dr. Hussein A. Sharaf and Dr. R. K. Mautz have de­
veloped an operational concept of independence in order to 
help the auditor to evaluate his independence. This opera­
tional concept focuses on the operational relationship 
between the auditor and the client. One phase of such a 
relationship is that the client's influence or control may 
be so subtle that the auditor may not be aware of its un­
less he is constantly alert to such a possibility. In addi­
tion, in the auditor's desire to serve the client, the 
client may influence the auditor more than he should. These 
possibilities increase the need for a clear concept of in­
dependence . ^
Independence in a client-auditor relationship can 
be affected by economic pressure, social obligation or per­
sonal relationships. The concept of independence is com­
plex and should be subdivided into at least three parts in 
order to understand more fully the ways in which independence
21
Hussein 'A. Sharaf and R. K. Mautz, "An Opera­
tional Concept of Independence," The Journal of Accountancy, 
Vol. 109 (April, 1960), pp. 51-52.
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can be destroyed. The three dimensions of independence are 
programming independence, investigative independence, and 
reporting independence. These dimensions are defined in 
the following manner:
1. Programming independence: Freedom from con­
trol or undue influence in the selection of 
audit technique and procedures and in the 
extent of their application. This requires 
that the auditor have freedom to develop his 
own program, both as to steps to be included 
and the amount of work to be performed, with­
in the overall bounds of the engagement.
2. Investigative independence: Freedom from con­
trol and undue influence in the selection of 
areas, activities, personal relationships and 
managerial policies to be examined. This re­
quires that no legitimate source of informa­
tion be closed to the auditor.
3. Reporting independence: Freedom from control
or undue influence in the statement of facts 
revealed by the examination or in the expres­
sion of recommendations or opinions as a re­
sult of the examination. The relationship of 
reporting to the examination has been neatly 
expressed in the following: "You tell us what
to do and we'll tell you what we can write in 
our report; you tell us what you want us to 
say in our report, and we'll tell you what we 
have to do."22
Having segmented the concept of independence into 
three parts, there are guidelines which can be utilized by 
the auditor to guard against both the obvious and subtle 
influence on his independence. These guidelines as pro­
posed under the approach of an operational concept of in­
dependence are as follows:
22
Ibid.
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Programming Independence
1. Freedom from managerial interference or fric­
tion intended to eliminate, specify, or modify 
any portion of the audit.
2. Freedom from interference with or an unco­
operative attitude respecting the application 
of selected procedures.
3. Freedom from any outside attempts to subject 
the audit work to review other than that pro­
vided for in the audit process.
Investigative Independence
1. Direct and free access to all company books, 
records, officers and employees and other 
sources of information with respect to busi­
ness activities, obligations, and resources.
2. Active cooperation from managerial personnel 
during the course of the auditor's examination.
3. Freedom from any managerial attempt to assign 
or specify the activities to be examined or to 
establish the acceptability of evidential mat­
ter.
4. Freedom from personal interests or relation­
ships leading to exclusion from or limitation 
of the examination of any activity, record or 
person that otherwise would have been included 
in the audit.
Reporting Independence
1. Freedom from any feeling of loyalty or obliga­
tion to modify the impact of reported facts
on any party.
2. Avoidance of the practice of excluding sig­
nificant matters from the formal report in 
favor of their inclusion in an informal re­
port of any kind.
3. Avoidance of intentional or unintentional use
of ambiguous language ih the statement of facts, 
opinions, and recommendations and in their in­
terpretation .
4. Freedom from any attempt to overrule the audi­
tor 's judgment as to appropriate content of the 
audit report, either factual matter or his
opinion.23
23
Ibid., p. 53.
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In order to make full use of the above detailed 
guidelines, it is necessary for the auditor to examine his 
activities and working situations in a very direct, un­
biased and straightforward manner. If the auditor is able 
to do this, he can better determine his degree of inde­
pendence and take corrective action, if need be, to insure 
that his independence is maintained.
A Behavioral Model of Independence 
When an auditor becomes engaged by a client, he is 
attempting to make an examination of the company's activi­
ties in order to form an opinion and render this opinion 
in a written report. This report is of interest to manage­
ment, shareholders of the firm and thi.rd parties, that is, 
potential investors, creditors and suppliers. The rela­
tionship between the auditor and these three groups can 
cause pressures which may affect an auditor's independence.
In order to understand the problems associated with 
an auditor's independence, it is helpful to look at the 
power that the firm and the auditor possess. The firm's 
source of power comes from the fact that the firm can 
choose an auditor from a large group of other auditors, can 
decide the conditions of employment, and can terminate such 
employment if desired. In addition, the management supplies 
the auditor with the facilities and information to do the
33
job. If management wishes to change the auditor's report,
24he can terminate the auditor's employment.
The auditor's source of power comes from the type 
of services he renders to the client and how these ser­
vices are viewed by the client. The higher the number of 
nonroutine problems handled by the auditor, the more power 
he exercises as opposed to the power of the client. In 
addition, the greater the number of services that the audi­
tor performs directly for the paying client, the more im­
portant these services become and consequently, the more 
power the auditor has. In viewing the auditor as compared 
to other professionals, for instance lawyers or physi­
cians, it becomes clear that the power weilded by an audi­
tor is low. The reason for this is that most of the prob­
lems handled by an auditor are routine and the services 
provided are paid for by the client but used mostly by 
third parties. These factors cause the auditor's power to
be minimal and put the auditor in a vulnerable position
25with regard to client pressures.
The auditor's conduct is guided by a code of ethics 
and standards. When the code of ethics is enforced, an 
auditor's power is increased. The auditor, however, must
24Arieh Goldman and Benzion Barley, "The Auditor- 
Firm Conflict of Interests: Its Implications for Inde­
pendence," The Accounting Review, Vol. 49 (October, 1974), 
p. 707.
25Ibid., pp. 710-711.
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constantly be alert to pressures and strive to maintain his 
independence. The ability of the auditor to withstand pres­
sures is dependent upon the balance of power between the 
auditor and the firm. This is illustrated in the diagram 
of a behavioral model of independence shown on the follow­
ing page. The way an auditor behaves in a professional 
relationship is a result of many pressures. This behavior 
will affect the auditor's professional standing and will 
reflect on his- independence.
Aspects of Independence
Independence— A State of Mind
Independence is necessary in the practice of all 
professions and more especially, accounting. It is most 
important to understand that independence at its core is a 
state of mind. If a professional accountant is not con­
vinced in his own mind of his independence, then there is 
need for some soulsearching. Independence cannot be de­
fined accurately because it is a condition of the mind and 
character. Independence is a matter of professional integ­
rity, where integrity refers to the sense of uprightness of
27character, probity and honesty.
27
J. L. Carey and W. 0. Doherty, "The Concept of 
Independence: Review and Restatement," The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 121 (January, 1966), p. 39.
Diagram 1. A Behavioral Model of Independence
Independent Intervening Dependent
Variables Variable Variable
Firm1s source of power:
i) Ability to hire and 
fire auditor
ii) Ability to determine 
auditor's fees
Amount of 
firm's power
iii) Ability to determine 
work conditions x IkJ ^Auditor' s Behavior
ability to ^  according to 
^  professionalwithstand
pressure standards
Auditor's source of power: 51
i) Nature of the problem 
solved (routine, non­
routine) /
ii) Beneficiaries from 
the services (firm, 
third parties)
> Amount of 
auditor1s power
iii) State of professional 
ethics
Source: Arieh Goldman and Benzion Bariev, "The Auditor-Firm Conflict
of Interests: Its Implications for Independence," The
Accounting Review, Vol. 49 (October, 1974), p. 712.
oj
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While independence is essentially a state of mind, 
this concept can be explored in terms of three phases of 
independence as follows: professional independence, audit
independence, and perceived independence.
Professional independence refers to that which the 
auditor must achieve. He must have a nonsubordinate, con­
fident approach and attitude towards his client. The audi­
tor must be free from management's control and influence
in making decisions. He must use as a basis for decisions
2 8his own professional expertise.
Audit independence is the second phase of independ­
ence. This type of independence can be summarized as fol­
lows :
It is most important that the CPA not only shall 
refuse to subordinate his judgment to that of 
others but that he be independent of any self- 
interest which might warp his judgment even sub­
consciously in reporting whether or not the 
financial position and net income are fairly 
presented. Independence in this context means 
objectivity or lack of bias in forming delicate 
judgments.29
This lack of bias may be viewed on two levels. One level 
can be called the "objective audit independence." Objec­
tive audit independence refers to the auditor avoiding any
2 8D. R. Carmichael and R. J. Swieringa, "Compati­
bility of Auditing Independence and Management Services—  
An Identification of Issues," The Accounting Review, Vol. 
43 (October, 1968), p. 698.
29John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Certified 
Public Accountants (New York: American Institute of
Accountants, 1956), p. 21.
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intentional favoring of a client's interests in planning 
the examination, gathering evidence, or preparing the audit 
report. If an auditor would consciously use ambiguous 
wording in his report or put important matters in an in­
formal report rather than the formal report, then he would 
lack objective audit independence. The second level of a 
lack of bias in audit independence is known as "subjective 
audit independence." Subjective audit independence refers 
to an auditor avoiding unintentional feelings which favor 
a client's interests when the auditor performs his work.
For example, an auditor who is basically honest can lack 
subjective audit independence due to a limited ability for
examination. However, an auditor who does not have objec-
30tive audit independence does not have basic integrity.
Perceived independence is the third phase of inde­
pendence. It refers to how an accountant's independence 
appears to the public. There are two facets of perceived 
independence which need to be examined. On one hand, it is 
important for a reasonable, knowledgeable person to per­
ceive an individual practitioner as independent. The 
emphasis is on a one to one basis. Another level of per­
ceived independence is the general public's perception of 
the whole accounting profession. This level of perceived
■^Carmichael and Swieringa, 0£. cit., p. 698.
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independence has to do with a professional image. Individ­
ual accountants as well as the profession as a whole should
31be perceived as being independent.
It is by looking at independence in appearance and 
independence in reality that the importance of maintaining 
independence in the accounting profession strongly comes 
forth.
Independence— Appearance and Reality
An accountant may feel that he is independent when 
he examines his own state of mind. He may feel that he has 
a high degree of professional integrity and will do all he 
can to carry out his assignment honestly and objectively. 
However, the accountant must also be concerned with the 
appearance of independence.
A former chairman of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants' Committee on Professional Ethics 
pinpointed this problem as follows:
There are actually two kinds of independence 
which a CPA must have— independence in fact and 
independence in appearance. The former refers 
to a CPA's objectivity, to the quality of not be­
ing influenced by regard to personal advantage.
The latter means his freedom from potential con­
flicts of interest which might tend to shake 
public confidence in his independence in fact.
~^Ibid. , p . 699.
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Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics: A Time
for Reappraisal," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 113 
(March, 1962), p. 31.
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An accountant must know that he is independent. He must
also consider how he seems to others. It is impossible for
anyone to know exactly how something seems to any person or
33group. Consequently, the rule of reason must be used.
The following questions could serve as a guideline 
for determining whether an auditor's independence has been 
encrouched upon in any way:
1. Will a specific relationship really tempt 
an auditor to subordinate ,his professional 
judgment, despite all sanctions to the 
contrary?
2. Would it seem to reasonable observers to 
be likely to do so?
3. How would it affect the public interest?
Who is likely to be hurt.34
The auditor, in dealing with the problems of inde­
pendence in reality and independence in appearance, must 
remember that auditors have to be concerned with how third
parties do in fact view the profession— not how the audi-
35tors think third parties ought to view the profession.
Having reviewed the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants' ethical standard of independence, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission's viewpoint on independ­
ence and several other approaches and issues involved in
33
Carey and Doherty, "The Concept of Independence: 
Review and Restatement," p. 39.
34 .
Ibid., p. 42.
35
Eugene G. Taper, "Independence— Our Public Image," 
The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 126 (August, 1968), p. 67.
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understanding the issue of independence, it is useful to 
summarize the accounting profession's view of independence.
In general, the following five statements apply to 
accountants:
1. We have to be independent.
2. We have to appear to be independent.
3. Independence can't be precisely defined 
because it is a state of mind.
4. We can't be independent if we have a 
financial interest.
5. We can't be independent if we are asso­
ciated too closely with management.36
It is this last statement which gives rise to the 
following question: How can CPA firms who have maintained
client relations with one client over a period of years 
still consider themselves to be independent? Is it not 
possible that client pressures and influences have built 
up, perhaps subtly, over the years so as to negate a CPA's 
independence in fact as well as independence in appear­
ance?
Since independence is so important to the account­
ing profession, it would appear to be useful to consider any 
way in which this cornerstone of professionalism could be 
maintained and strengthened. A possible answer to the 
problem of maintaining and strengthening independence with­
in the profession is the rotation of auditors. By rotation 
of auditors, it is meant a compulsory rotation of account­
ing firms among clients every three to five years. By having
36Ibid., p. 65.
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CPA firms rotate from one client to another every few years, 
long associations with their potential buildup of pressures 
and influences are avoided. The auditor's state of mind is 
truly independent because he knows that his work will be 
reviewed by other accountants from other firms that will 
follow. The auditor's sense of professional integrity is 
heightened because he knows there is nothing to gain by 
letting his work be influenced by management pressures. In 
addition, a CPA's independence in fact and in appearance is 
strengthened. This is something with which the auditor 
must continually be concerned.
The rotation of auditors is a possible answer to 
the problem of maintaining independence within the account­
ing profession. Likewise, the maintaining of independence 
is set forth as the chief advantage of adopting a policy of 
rotation of auditors.
A Fresh Point of View 
A second advantage often cited by those who advo­
cate a policy of rotation of auditors is that such a policy 
offers the client a fresh point of view. A firm which has 
a long, close association with a client may tend to 
approach the work for the client in a casual manner. A
certain laxness in the auditor's approach might result after
37a period of years.
37Robert K. Mautz, "Rotation of Auditors," Finan­
cial Executive, Vol. 42 (July, 1974), p. 53.
42
Rotation of auditors can bring in new auditors who
have a fresh point of view and possibly a different
approach to the existing accounting operation. With this
fresh point of view, a new auditor may discover problems
which the previous auditor failed to notice. The new
accounting firm which is hired to replace an old firm
brings with it new blood. This causes everyone connected
3 8with the audit to be more alert. The present firm of
auditors will generally perform an audit of higher quality
because they know that another firm will be reviewing their
39work at a later date.
Rotation of auditors is practiced by some of the 
large CPA firms in assigning auditing staffs to clients. 
Every year or two the members of an auditing team are 
rotated so that the same people do not audit the same cli­
ent year after year. The same firm audits the client, but 
not the same people.
Although this type of rotation is better than no 
rotation at all, it does not go far enough. Even though 
the audit team members are rotated, the work is still over­
seen and reviewed by the same audit manager. Therefore 
his viewpoint and approach to the client's problems are the
3 8N. Loyall McLaren, "Rotation of Auditors," The 
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 106 (July, 1958), p. 42.
39Alan J. Winters, "Looking at the Auditor Rotation 
Issue," Management Accounting, Vol. 57 (March, 1976), 
p . 30.
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same year after year. Another problem is that a staff 
auditor may have a certain expertise in a given area and 
cannot be rotated away from a particular client because 
there is no one else qualified to replace him. This means 
that the same person audits the same client year after 
year.
It is difficult to be completely objective when 
reviewing your own work. An audit staff which comes in to 
review work done in the past by the same firm already has 
a bias that the work is correct and presented in the best 
manner possible simply because their firm did the work.
The overall philosophy and viewpoint of the auditing firm 
is still exercised year after year even though the rota­
tion of auditing staff members is practiced.
The rendering of an audit opinion by a newly en­
gaged firm of certified public accountants offers a new, 
fresh, and completely objective analysis of a client's 
financial position and his accounting procedures. A policy 
of rotation of auditors is a means of securing such 
opinions. Rotation of auditors supplies the client with 
another professional opinion and a fresh insight into his 
business operations. Previously undetected problem areas 
may come to light, as well as new methods or systems for 
handling the operations of the client's business.
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Reducing Litigation Against Accountants
A third advantage of a policy of rotation of audi­
tors is the possible reduction of litigation against 
accountants. In today's environment where numerous cases 
against accountants are being tried in the courts, this is 
an important advantage to examine and consider.
In the past ten years, the cases involving account­
ants have grown in number. Persons who suffer financial 
losses in dealing with companies are turning more and more 
to accountants as a possible source from which to obtain 
some reparation. The accounting profession as a whole 
seems to have developed into a perfect object against 
which to bring any malpractice claim based on allegedly 
faulty audits which arise supposedly as a result of over­
sights, improper accounting practices or accounting methods 
which were negligently carried out.^
How Does Litigation Affect the 
Accounting Profession?
In answering this question, it is helpful to review 
some of the more prominent cases involving accountants. By 
doing so, the results of these cases will shed some light 
on the effect of litigation on the accounting profession.
In addition, in order to understand the legal basis for
40Arnold Levine and E. Stanley Marks, "Accountants' 
Liability Insurance— Perils and Pitfalls," The Journal of 
Accountancy, Vol. 142 (October, 1976), p. 59.
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some of the cases brought against accountants, it is neces­
sary to examine the fundamental security acts set forth by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930's.
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche 
(January 1931)
The Ultramares Corporation v. Touche case involved 
an action brought by a company, who dealt with Fred Stern 
and Company, against the public accounting firm of Touche, 
Niven and Company. Fred Stern and Company was in the busi­
ness of importing and selling rubber. The plaintiff com­
pany did business with Fred Stern and Company chiefly as a 
factor. Touche, Niven and Company audited the statements 
of Fred Stern and Company and expressed a clean opinion on 
them. The plaintiff company relied on the statements in 
making substantial loans to Fred Stern and Company. Nearly 
a year later, Fred Stern and Company declared bankruptcy.
The plaintiff company action was brought against Touche, 
Niven and Company to recover the losses which it sustained 
from the loans, which were made based on a misrepresenta­
tion of the accountants. The action was for negligence and
■p  ^  4 1  fraud.
The court concluded that there was no proof of fraud 
and therefore no liability against the accountants. As to
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 17 0 
(November 18, 1930 to February 19, 1931), pp. 175-176.
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the question of negligence, Judge Cardozo had this to 
say:
If liability for negligence exists, a 
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to 
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover 
of deceptive entries, may expose account­
ants to a liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an in­
determinate class. The hazards of a busi­
ness conducted on these terms are so extreme 
as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not 
exist in the implication of a duty that ex­
poses to these consequences.42
The court felt that it would be against public policy to 
subject accountants to a completely open-ended liability 
which would be based on the certification of the financial 
statements. If, however, an accountant's work was proved 
to be fraudulent or grossly negligent, he would be held 
liable to a larger group of persons, rather than just to 
the client or a person who was'known to be a key user of 
the information.42
A plaintiff, as a result of this case, had the bur­
den of establishing certain elements in any action brought 
against accountants. He would have to prove that he was 
adversely affected by relying on the financial statements 
and gather enough evidence to prove that the accountant was 
grossly negligent when he conducted his audit. Finally, a
42Ibid., pp. 179-180.
43nenry B. Reiling and Russell A. Taussig, "Recent 
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," The Journal 
of Accountancy, Vol. 130 (September, 1970), p. 40.
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plaintiff would have to prove that he was a member of the
group of possible foreseen plaintiffs that might bring an
44action against the accountant.
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934
After the Ultramares case, in March of 1932, the 
United States Senate authorized an investigation into the 
practices of stock issuers and brokers. As a result of the 
report to the House of Representatives, Congress wanted 
regulation of securities. The legislation which was pro­
duced was the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion was formed under the authority of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 to carry out the laws under the two 
acts.
The objective of the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission and the acts was to make certain that investors 
were provided with complete disclosure of important facts 
regarding publicly offered securities. The Securities Act 
of 1933 had the primary purpose of regulating the initial 
offering and selling of any securities that utilize the 
mail to make offers or to distribute stock. This regula­
tion is accomplished mainly through the requirement that
^Michael Kennedy, "Accountants' Liability Over­
view," Pennsylvania C.P.A. Spokesman, Vol. 46 (November, 
1975), p. 5.
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any company offering securities must file a registration 
statement and a prospectus containing financial information
most of which has been certified by an independent account-
. 45 ant.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides 
any person, who has bought a security for which a registra­
tion statement has been filed, with a federal right of 
action if the registration statement contains misleading 
statements or information or if it fails to include in­
formation which would make the registration statement mis­
leading. This section of the Act caused two changes to 
occur as regards the civil cases brought against account­
ants. First, this section significantly enlarged the group 
of potential plaintiffs who could sue accountants than had 
previously been the case. Second, the burden of proof 
rested less with the plaintiff and more with the account­
ant. Basically, if a plaintiff could prove that the in­
formation in the registration statement was misleading, 
then the company involved had no possible defense. Conse­
quently, the accountant was open to liability to third
parties unless he could substantiate a defense of "due dili- 
46gence." "Due diligence" is defined in Section 11(b) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 as follows:
45K. Fred Skousen, An Introduction to the S.E.C. 
(Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Company, 1976),
p. 19.
^Kennedy, op. cit. , p. 6.
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. . . no person, other than the issuer, shall
be liable . . . who shall sustain the burden of 
proof . . . (3) that (A) as regards any part of
the registration statement not purporting to be 
made on the authority of any expert . . .  he had, 
after reasonable investigation, reasonable 
ground to believe and did believe, at the time 
such part of the registration statement became 
effective, that the statements therein were true 
and that there was no omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein not misleading;
. . . and (C) as regards any part of the registra­
tion statement purporting to be made on the 
authority of an expert (other than himself) . . . 
he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not 
believe, at the time such part of the registration 
statement became effective, that the statements 
therein were untrue or that there was an omission 
to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading. . . .47
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 basically ex­
tended the regulation of securities beyond the initial 
offering and distribution. This Act embodies all of the 
necessary authority to regulate the buying and selling of 
securities on national exchanges. With the extension of 
the laws to cover not only the initial offering of securi­
ties, but also the continuous buying and selling of securi­
ties, the accountant was further plagued with the possibil­
ity of federal actions brought in connection with continu-
48ous buying and selling transactions.
47Securities Act of 1933, Statutes at Large, Vol.
48, Ch. 38, p. 82 
48
Kennedy, op. cit., p. 6.
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McKesson and Robbins, Inc. (December 
1938)
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an action 
was brought against McKesson and Robbins, Inc., based on the 
supposition that the information in the registration state­
ment and financial statements was false and misleading.
The statements were prepared and certified by Price, Water­
house and Company. The fraud resulted in a figure of more 
than $87,000,000 in consolidated assets being reported on 
the financial statements, of which approximately $19,000,000 
were entirely fictitious. In reviewing the case, the Court 
addressed itself to several points, including the specific 
auditing procedures employed, the degree to which generally 
accepted standards were followed, and the sufficiency of
safeguards in the standards to guarantee reliable and accu-
49rate financial statements.
The court concluded that the statements conformed
with generally accepted procedures but that there should be
a considerable advancement made in developing auditing
procedures to verify records and documents by actual physi-
50cal inspection of items involved. As a result of the 
case, the accounting profession established new standards 
with regard to confirming accounts receivable and observing 
inventories.
49SEC Accounting Rules, Topical Law Reports (New 
York: Commerce Clearing House, Inc.), pp. 3039-3040.
50Ibid., p. 3045.
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Yale Express (April 5, 1967)
In the Fischer v. Kletz case, better known as the 
Yale Express case, the plaintiff brought action against the 
accounting firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company in 
connection with the financial statements of Yale Express 
System, Inc., a company involved in national transporta­
tion. The action was brought against the accountants as a
result of their failure to disclose figures which were dis-
51covered to be materially false and inaccurate.
The original financial statements for the year 1963 
were audited and certified on March 31, 1964. In April 
the statements were issued to the stockholders. In June, 
the statements were included in a Form 10-K Report which 
was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. How­
ever, early in 1964, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company 
was hired to perform special studies of past revenue and 
expense items. As a result of the study, Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Company found the figures in the 1963 annual 
report to be false and misleading. It was not until May of 
1965 that the auditors disclosed these results to the 
stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission or 
the public.^
51
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F.S. 180, pp. 182-183.
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In addition to the above stated facts, although 
Yale wanted to issue interim statements, Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Company said that the company could not use 
the results of the special studies in the interim state­
ments. The figures which were used in the interim re­
ports were those generated through Yale's own internal 
accounting procedures. The resulting interim statements 
contained unaudited and uncertified figures, which were 
shown to be false and misleading. The charge against 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company by the plaintiffs was 
that they should have disclosed the fact that the 1963 
financial statement figures as well as the interim state­
ment figures were false and misleading at the time such 
information was discovered. The plaintiffs' contention 
was that the accountants had a duty to disclose this in­
formation since they knew that the public would rely on 
the audited and certified statements. Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Company contended that there was no common 
law or statutory basis for performing such a duty as 
accountants hired by Yale Express System, Inc. According
to the auditors, the duty to report to the public ended
53when they certified the 1963 financial statements.
Judge Tyler issued an opinion on this case. With 
regard to the work of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company
53Ibid.
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as auditor of the financial statements, the firm was an in­
dependent public accountant. As such, his responsibility, 
as stated by Judge Tyler, "is not only to the client who 
pays his fee, but also to investors, creditors and others 
who may rely on the financial statements which he certi­
fies. . . . The public accountant must report fairly on the
facts as he finds them whether favorable or unfavorable to
his client. His duty is to safeguard the public interest,
54not that of his client." After certifying the financial 
statements, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company assumed a 
new role of an accountant hired to do special studies whose 
first duty was to his client rather than to the public. As 
a result of these two different roles and the discovery of 
materially false and misleading information, a problem 
arose. As Judge Tyler stated.
The serious question arises as to whether or 
not an obligation correlative to but conceptu­
ally different from the duty to audit and to cer­
tify with reasonable care and professional com­
petence arose as a result of the circumstance 
that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company knew 
that investors were relying upon its certifica­
tion of the financial statements in Yale's annual 
report.55
A resolution to this question was not a point dis­
cussed in Judge Tyler's opinion. However, the Yale Express 
case, in posing this unique question, lead the accounting
54Ibid., p. 184.
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profession to issue in October of 1969 Statement on Audit­
ing Procedure 41 entitled "Subsequent Discovery of Facts 
Existing at the Date of the Auditor's Report." This state­
ment says, in essence, that when subsequent facts are dis­
covered and determined to be reliable, revised financial 
statements should be issued. In addition, disclosure 
should be made to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
stock exchanges and any other persons known to be relying 
on the financial statements.^
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corpora­
tion (March 29, 1968)
In the BarChris case, the purchasers of convertible
debentures brought action against BarChris Construction
Corporation, the corporation underwriters and the auditors
under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. The charge
was that the registration statement contained statements
which were considered materially false and that the state-
57ment exhibited material omissions.
At issue in the case was one point involving a 
sale and leaseback transaction. The courts ruled that the 
profits on such a transaction should have been eliminated.
5 6Statement on Auditing Procedure 41; Subsequent 
Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditor's 
Report (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc., 1969), pp. 69-70.
57
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, 
283 F.S. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), p. 643.
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As of the date of the statements, there was no clear-cut
rule within the accounting profession on the treatment of
sale-leaseback agreements. However, as a result of the
court being presented with several accounting methods in
the BarChris case, the court outlined a treatment it con-
5 8sidered proper. This expostulation of preferred account­
ing methods by the courts can have far reaching effects on 
the profession.
The BarChris case itself was the first important 
case decided under Section 11 involving a major firm. The 
defendants in the BarChris case used the "due diligence" 
defense as stated in Section 11(b) of the Securities Act 
of 1933. The courts ruled that the new directors were 
liable for statements if they did not investigate state­
ments by posing questions of experts, which they did not.
As a result of this finding, directors are asking their 
auditors to examine and give an expert opinion on more of 
the information submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission than was previously done. The accountants 
attempted to use the "due diligence" defense in the case 
by stating that when the registration statement went into 
effect, they believed that the audited statements were 
not misleading. To arrive at this conclusion the account­
ants had to examine the company's S-l Form for registration
58
Reiling and Taussig, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
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under the Securities Act of 1933. The failure of the
auditors lay in not properly carrying out all the steps
in the S-l program as it was written. The court ruled
that the accountants had therefore failed to show "due
diligence." This ruling illustrates new areas of concern
for the accounting profession. Where there were undefined
standards of practice, the courts may very well stipulate 
59standards.
Continental Vending (June, 1968)
In United States v. Simon, criminal action was 
brought against the accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross 
Bros, and Montgomery, specifically against two partners 
and an audit manager. The United States Attorney's 
office for the Southern District of New York instituted 
the case.
The case involved the certification of misleading 
financial statements by Lybrand, Ross Bros, and Montgomery. 
The misleading financial statements involved the reporting 
of sizable loans by Continental Vending to an affiliate, 
Valley Commercial Corporation. The loans in fact were 
loans to the president of Continental for his personal stock 
market transactions. The collateral pledged by the presi­
dent for the loans through Valley Commercial Corporation
59
Ibid., pp. 4 3-44.
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was inadequate. However, the footnote on the Continental
financial statements, to which the auditors attested, did
not disclose this information. The court said that the
prosecution had only to prove that the accountants had
certified a financial statement which they knew to be
false. The result of the case was that the accountants
6 0were found guilty by a jury.
The importance of this case for the accounting pro­
fession is that it was a criminal action rather than a 
civil action involving a major accounting firm. Such cases, 
prior to this time, had been infrequent. As a result of 
this case, it is necessary for public accountants to real­
ize that they are not free from legal liability simply be­
cause they adhere to generally accepted auditing standards 
and generally accepted auditing principles. Such prin­
ciples and standards are looked upon only as minimum re-
61quirements for the public accountant.
Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder 
(March 30, 1976)
The case of Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder involved
a charge of negligence in failing to uncover fraudulent
practices in the First Securities Company of Chicago, a
^Reiling and Taussig, "Recent Liability Cases—  
Implications for Accountants," pp. 48-49.
C I
Charles Gibson, "Analysis' of Continental Vending 
Machine (U. S. v. Simon)," Ohio C.P.A., Vol. 30 (Winter, 
1971), p. 16.
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brokerage firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange. 
Leston B. Nay, president of First Securities Company, con­
vinced the plaintiffs, who were customers of First Securi­
ties, to invest in escrow accounts which would give a high 
rate of return. Mr. Nay used the funds for his own pur­
poses. In 1968, when Nay committed suicide, he left a 
note explaining that there were really no escrow accounts 
and that First Securities Company was bankrupt, since he 
owned 92% of its stock. All of the transactions for the 
funds into the escrow accounts were unrecorded and the
customers never received any receipts for their deposits
6 2or an accounting of the balance in the escrow accounts.
Ernst and Ernst had done the audit work for First 
Securities Company from 1946 to 1967. They had also pre­
pared the annual report which was filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. The customers brought charges 
against Ernst and Ernst under Section 10 (b) of the Securi­
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC Rule 10b-5. The 
charge was that Ernst and Ernst was negligent in its 
application of auditing procedures since it failed to dis­
cover the fraud. The fraud was mainly executed by means of 
Leston Nay's mail rule. All mail addressed to Nay was to 
be opened only by him even if he was absent from his desk 
for long periods of time. The plaintiffs charged that
^Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 47 
L.Ed.2d 668, p. 189.
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effective auditing would have investigated this mail rule
and disclosed the fraud. The case brought by the customers
clearly stated that they were not charging Ernst and Ernst
with intentional fraud, but only with "inexcusable negli- 
„ 6 3gence.
Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder directly confronts
the courts with the question of what is the scope of an
accountant's liability under Rule 10b-5. Previous to this
case, the scope of an accountant's liability had been more
subject to interpretation. Some courts, in previous cases,
understood the rule to cover both negligent and intentional
conduct. Other courts felt that the rule was directed only
64at an intentional participation in a fraud.
The opinion in Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder was 
significant because it narrowed an area of the account­
ant's liability. The way in which the language of Rule 
10b-5 under Section 10(b) was interpreted in past cases 
left accountants wide open to potential investor-plaintiffs. 
Courts who felt that language such as "manipulative" and 
"deceptive" in the rule applied not only to an intentional 
act of fraud, but also to a negligent act, wanted the rule 
and statute to protect investors from all bad practices—
63Ibid., p. 190.
J. Jay Hampson, "Accountants' Liability--The 
Significance of Hochfelder," The Journal of Accountancy, 
Vol. 146 (December, 1976), pp. 69-70.
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both intentional and negligent. This set up a negligence 
standard in Rule 10b-5(2). In the Ernst and Ernst v. 
Hochfelder case the Supreme Court discarded this broadened 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5. The court stated the fol­
lowing :
Viewed in isolation the language of subsection 
(b), and arguably that of subsection (c) , could be 
read as proscribing, respectively, any type of 
material misstatement or omission, and any course 
of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding in­
vestors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or 
not.65
The result of the Hochfelder decision, as far as 
the accounting profession is concerned, is that it is more 
difficult to bring suit against accountants. Under Rule 
10b-5, an accountant can now be said to be liable only if, 
to some degree, he had knowledge of the fraud or some par­
ticipation in it. This decision of the Supreme Court in 
Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder gives hope to the accounting 
profession. It stops the public from believing that an 
accountant is involved in fraud when a charge only involves 
negligence. This decision helps to emphasize what an in­
vestor can expect from financial statements as opposed to
6 6what is the auditor's duty.
Each of these cases discussed above points out some 
area where the accountant was found to be less than
^Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, op. cit., p. 212.
Hampson, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
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thorough in the performance of his duty as an auditor.
Each of the cases resulted in some action being taken, 
either by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which 
involved the profession. The cases discussed are only a 
sample of the number of cases involving accountants which 
have been brought before the courts. The number of cases 
seems to grow year by year. Since there is a trend of 
bringing legal suits against accountants and putting 
their liability to a test, a person outside of the 
accounting profession might wonder at the reason for all 
of the litigation which has built up over the last fifteen 
years.
Why Does Litigation Against 
Accountants Continue?
The increasing amount of litigation that is in­
stituted against accountants has caused many to wonder 
about the credibility of auditors. In conjunction with 
increased litigation, there has been a great deal of 
criticism from the public and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the press and in speeches.
Why does this situation exist? In 1973, a group 
of professional leaders met with the Board of Directors 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
to discuss the causes and solution for this situation. 
After some discussion the consensus of opinion was as
62
follows: "A gap exists between the expectations of the
users of auditor's services and what the profession be-
6 7lieved was feasible to provide." This gap could be
called the "responsibility gap."
In general, criticism of accountants arises when 
a business fails or a company experiences significant 
losses. It is then that charges are leveled against audi­
tors who supposedly have failed to execute their duty in 
one of two ways. Either the auditor neglected to ensure 
that the accounting and financial reporting and disclosure 
were correct or the auditor did not do a proper job of
auditing and was therefore guilty of negligence or pos- 
6 8sibly fraud. In response to all of this litigation 
against accountants, all types of persons have expressed 
opinions on the accountant's responsibilities. These per­
sons include investors, credit grantors, spokesmen for 
stock exchanges, bankers, financial analysts and prominent 
businessmen, as well as auditors themselves.
The responsibility gap exists between accountants 
and the public because of the failure of the public to 
understand the responsibilities of the accountant as they 
exist in the context of an audit performed to render an
r
Wallace E. Olson, "A Look at the Responsibility 
Gap," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 139 (January, 1975), 
p. 52.
68 . , _ Ibid., p . 53.
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opinion. Areas of misunderstanding exist with regard to 
the auditor's following responsibilities:
1. Detection of fraud and irregularities
2. Judgments in appraising the application
of generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples
3. Due care in conducting an opinion audit
4. Judgments where there are no established
standards
5. Judgments about reasonableness of the
total result of individual parts.69
These areas of misunderstanding basically boil down
to one problem between what the public believes and what is
in fact the case. The responsibility gap, also referred to
as the expectation gap, is best summed up in the following
manner: "The consuming public, many regulators, courts,
and lawyers believe that the auditor is a guarantor or in-
70surer of the company's financial solvency." The reason 
behind this is that accountants use numbers which imply 
exactness and so the public views financial statements as 
being accurate. Even though assets equal liabilities plus 
ownership equity, the public does not realize that the pre­
cision ends at that point. The accounting profession com­
plicates the matter by using words such as "certified" in 
relation to financial statements. The result of all this 
is that an expectation gap, a responsibility gap, has
®^Ibid., p. 54.
70Carl D. Liggio, "The Expectation Gap: The
Accountant's Legal Waterloo?" The C.P.A., Vol. 45 (July, 
1975), p. 24.
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arisen between what the public expects and what an account-
71ant can reasonably be capable of performing.
Until the gap is lessened, the accounting profes­
sion can expect to experience moire and more lawsuits in 
addition to more criticism.
What Can Accountants Do to 
Protect Themselves?
In general, with the abundance of litigation as a 
reality faced by the accounting profession, the best way 
for an accountant to protect himself is to render to his 
client his best performance. If a suit follows, an account­
ant should be firm in defending himself. The best method
of discouraging potential plaintiffs is to defend and re-
72fute cases which are not based on any merit.
When the accountant looks to specific guidelines
that will help him to protect himself, there come to light
several articles which have been written since 1969 about
73rules for minimizing liability risks. These rules or
^^Ibid., p. 25.
72Victor M. Earle, III, "The Litigation Explosion," 
The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129 (March, 1970), p. 67.
73For a comprehensive discussion of these rules, 
see: Donald Stuart Bab, "The CPA's Expanding Legal Liabil­
ity," The Practical Accountant, Vol. 6 (March/April, 1973), 
pp. 43-50; James P. Bedingfield, "The Effect of Recent 
Litigation on Audit Practice," The Journal of Accountancy, 
Vol. 135 (May, 1974), pp. 55-62; Joe R. Fritzemeyer, "Seven 
Rules for Minimizing the Risks of Liability," The Journal 
of Accountancy, Vol. 127 (Tune, 1969), pp. 64-65; Richard L. 
Miller, Jr., "Cases on Acc-ntants 1 Liability— Some Rules of 
Safe Practice," Pennsylvania CPA Spokesman, Vol. 46 (Novem-
65
guidelines for accountants can be outlined and summarized 
as follows:
1. Be careful in selecting or accepting new clients.
Avoid taking clients whom you consider to be untrust­
worthy. Even though audit standards do not include 
guidelines for reviewing a potential client's reputa­
tion, it is important for the accountant to use his 
judgment especially in the case of a client whose 
standards are not in accordance with those of most 
businesses and other professionals. This special care 
is necessary to protect the accountant and also to 
decrease the possibility of financial losses for per­
sons investing with a potential client.
2. Once the client has been accepted, write up the agree­
ment of the work to be done in an engagement letter.
Make the client cognizant of the fact that the certi­
fied public accountant is not an insurer and explain 
to him exactly what duties and responsibilities the 
accountant takes upon himself.
3. Once the terms of the engagement have been settled, be 
sure that there are an adequate number of mature and 
experienced persons staffing and supervising every 
phase of the work.
\
ber, 1975), pp. 7-13; Norman 0. Olson, "The Auditor in 
Legal Difficulty— What's the Answer?" The Journal of 
Accountancy, Vol. 129 (Spril, 1970), pp. 39-44.
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4. Carry out every step listed in the engagement letter 
thoroughly.
5. Know the client's business and be aware of trouble 
spots. Take special care in these areas. Later, if 
the courts say that you as the accountant knew or 
should have known about a particular problem, you can 
say that you did know.
6. It is essential to be thoroughly knowledgeable about 
generally accepted auditing standards and procedures 
and generally accepted accounting principles. Do not 
rely on these standards and principles totally. The 
compliance of the accountant with these guidelines is 
not always a complete defense before a court of law. 
The courts consider the body of professional litera­
ture as a minimum test to meet against liability. An 
accountant's professional judgment rather than mere 
adherence to rules is more significant before the 
courts.
7. Be thorough in writing up working papers. Be sure 
that they are complete, reviewed and retained in the 
client's file.
8. When writing footnotes and reports on audited finan­
cial statements, exercise extreme care. Be sure 
everything in the report is stated clearly, not just 
to fellow accountants but to laymen as well.
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9. In going through the audit program, be sure that
every step as listed is carried out. If any change 
is made, make reference to it in writing and ex­
plain the change, the reason for it, and the result 
of the change in the overall program.
10. If in performing procedures, exceptions turn up in 
testing, be sure that these exceptions are examined 
and eliminated in a satisfactory manner. Be sure 
that the working papers document the exceptions as 
well as what was done about them.
11. Explain exactly what work you have done and, if 
appropriate, what work you have omitted. When a 
phase of the work has been conducted differently from 
a standard engagement, it becomes critical that the 
language in your report is clear.
12. Consult legal counsel if you have a question about 
disclosure problems. Often the problem involved is 
not so much a matter of accounting as it is a mat­
ter of legal disclosure requirements. In this case, 
a lawyer may be able to supply some helpful advice.
13. Be prompt in billing and collecting fees. If un­
paid bills are allowed to exist, a question about 
the accountant's independence and objectivity may 
arise in the minds of third parties.
14. Obtain adequate insurance which will cover risks as 
well as legal expenses of defending a case if the 
need should ever arise.
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15. Maintain regular direct contact with the board of
directors of the client. The board of directors
should be made aware of any disputes which arise 
between management and the accountant. These 
measures help to maintain the independence of the 
accountant.
16. Be sure of all the accounting rules and procedures,
but go one step further. Ask yourself: Does it
make sense? Does the result of the work from an 
overall viewpoint make sense? Is the result likely 
to mislead a third party, i.e., "an uninformed but 
reasonable man"?
With all of these rules and guidelines to follow in 
order to minimize the possibility of litigation, the 
accounting profession might consider yet another rule or 
guideline. The guideline that is being proposed here is 
the systematic rotation of auditors. This policy would 
help to reduce the possibility of litigation. This would 
be accomplished in the following manner. A policy of 
rotation would cause the present auditors engaged by the 
company to be more exact and thorough in their work since 
they know that other auditing firms would be succeeding 
them. The new firms would be reviewing the previous audi­
tor's methods and procedures used in performing the audit 
engagement. This pressure of a review by another auditing 
firm would cause the auditors to fully examine and attempt
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to solve problem areas in the accounting system, thereby 
exploring some of the potentially dangerous areas which 
give rise to much of the costly litigation brought against 
accountants. In addition, the fresh point of view brought 
to a job by a new auditing firm would give the client a 
more objective, critical review which would also help to 
ferret out problem areas which could lead to litigation.
The majority of cases brought against accountants 
involve charges of negligence and/or fraud. By rotating 
the auditors, the present auditors would be more diligent 
and critical in their work due to professional pressure 
and would thereby reduce the possibility of litigation 
brought against accountants on the basis of negligence 
and/or fraud.
Summary
Over the past several years, the accounting profes­
sion has come under more and more scrutiny by the public, 
the courts, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The pressure has been put on the profession more and more 
to render accounting services with a high degree of integ­
rity and independence. One of the ways in which this might 
be accomplished is to adopt a policy of rotation of audi­
tors. The primary advantage of such a policy is the main­
taining and strengthening of independence. Another advan­
tage would be the offering of a fresh point of view to
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clients. A third advantage would be the reduction of the 
ever increasing amount of litigation brought against 
accountants. This chapter has discussed these three ad­
vantages. The following chapter will present the disad­
vantages of adopting a policy of rotation of auditors within 
the accounting profession.
Chapter 3
THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE ROTATION 
OF AUDITORS
In the process of considering a policy such as ro­
tation of auditors, it is necessary to understand and dis­
cuss the disadvantages of such a policy. In the preceding 
chapter the advantages were pointed out. This chapter will 
concentrate on the disadvantages. What exactly are con­
sidered the disadvantages of a policy of rotation of audi­
tors?
The disadvantages of a policy of rotation of audi­
tors are as follows:
1. Loss of large clients by CPA firms,
2. Adverse effects of installing new auditors,
3. Experience and information loss from previous 
audits, and
4. Disruption of types of services offered to 
the client.
Before discussing each of these disadvantages, it 
is necessary to clarify a point concerning a policy of 
rotation of auditors. If such a policy becomes general, it 
will be as a result of pressure from clients, and possibly 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and/or government.
71
72
This policy of rotation of auditors will be imposed on the 
CPA firms; in other words, the policy may become one of 
mandatory auditor rotation.
Loss of Large Clients by CPA Firms
One of the disadvantages of a policy of rotation of
auditors is the loss of large clients by the CPA firms.
This point is never specifically mentioned in articles 
which discuss the topic of rotation of auditors. The loss 
of clients by the CPA firms is a disadvantage from the 
point of view of the firm that is losing the client, whe­
ther the client is large or small.
A CPA firm that has done good and conscientious
work for a large client and that has worked to cultivate
a long and successful relationship would view the loss of 
such a client as a primary disadvantage of such a policy as 
rotation of auditors. The long years of association and 
close communication would be viewed as a tremendous asset 
to the working relationship between a client and a CPA firm.
To rotate the CPA firms among clients would make the CPA
firms feel that the effort put forth over the years for 
more efficient communication and better performance of the 
audit engagement was for naught. No CPA would not be able 
to build upon the hours of work, in some cases the years
of work, which have been invested with a given client.
Putting aside the issue of a good, long working re­
lationship, no CPA would like to lose a large, steady
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client as a source of revenue. This point is never men­
tioned in articles on rotation of auditors. However, it 
should be. Large clients involve large fees. To build 
up a steady clientele takes years of work. If the policy 
of auditor rotation becomes general, a given CPA's clien­
tele would be continuously changing and would cause new 
assessments to be made in terms of both the time and 
effort necessary to be expended on each client every year, 
not to mention the fluctuation of anticipated revenue from 
fees.
Adverse Effects of Installing 
New Auditors
The second disadvantage of rotation of auditors can 
be discussed in terms of the problems which arise when new 
auditors are installed. If a policy of rotation of audi­
tors was adopted, the adverse effects of installing new 
auditors would have to be dealt with on a frequent basis. 
Examination of these adverse effects focuses attention on 
the following separate areas:
1. Effect on fees
2. Effect on time
3. Effect on efficiency
Effect on Fees
Before discussing the ultimate effect of installing 
new auditors on the amount of the fee which a CPA firm
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charges a client, it is perhaps helpful to understand the 
components of a fee and how a fee is determined.
Basically a fee must be such as to cover direct 
expenses and general operating expenses, and also to earn 
a return for the partners of the firm. Accountants gener­
ally take into consideration several of the following 
factors when determining a fee:
1. Time spent on the engagement
2. Technical importance of the engagement 
(the responsibility assumed)
3. Value of the services to the client
4. Risk factors involved
5. Staff availability
6. Ability of t!' - client to pay
7. Maintaining professional standards 
(attendance at conferences, additional 
schooling, etc.)
8. Maintaining our facilities (staff, 
office equipment, library costs, etc.)
9. Reputation of the firm (will it be 
enhanced by performing the services 
for the client?)
10. Our "life needs" (enough money to pro­
vide a desired standard of living)
11. Keeping pace with national economic 
picture (rate-of-inflation, adjust­
ments )
12. Minimum fee factors (the going rate 
within the community; what was charged 
in prior years or in similar circum­
stances) ^
13. Various ethical considerations.
The Objective Portion of a Fee
The objective portion of a fee can be looked upon 
as being composed of a time factor, a research element, and 
certain direct and overhead expenses.
Bernard B. Eder, "A Three-Step Method of Arriving 
at a Fair Fee," The Practical Accountant, Vol. 5 (July/ 
August, 1972), p. 28.
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The first of these components, time, is unques­
tionably the largest element of any fee. In general, this 
factor is viewed mostly from the standpoint of the number 
of hours worked by the auditing staff. Their hourly rate 
would be based upon their salary, payroll taxes, insurance 
expense and other expenses directly related to the staff. 
Since the time devoted by the staff to a particular engage­
ment is such an important factor, it is necessary to keep 
very accurate records of the time spent on each particular 
assignment.^
In addition to the staff time, it is equally im­
portant for the time which a partner spends administering, 
planning and supervising the total effort of the engage­
ment to be added into the fee. Even though the partner's
part of the fee may be more arbitrarily determined, this
3
does not mean that it can be overlooked.
Another phase of the time component which must be 
discussed is the time which is spent by the clerical staff 
in typing and proof-reading final reports. How should 
this be handled? Should it be charged to the client or 
treated as a part of overhead? Either method is acceptable, 
although most firms will generally include in the fee a
o
W. H. Morgan, "The Objective Elements in a Fee,"
The Accountants' Journal (New Zealand), Vol. 52 (October,
1973), p. 114.
"^Ibid.
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charge for the amount of time the clerical staff spent on
4
the work of a given client.
The second objective component of a fee can be
accounted for in terms of the amount of research that is
necessary to complete a particular assignment. In some
cases it is necessary for some research to be done to
determine the generally accepted accounting principles that
apply or the pertinent auditing procedures that must be
carried out. Other cases may require investigation to
determine whether the client conforms to certain rules and
regulations enforced by government agencies. The area
where the most research may be done is in the area of a
client's tax problems. A considerable amount of research
5
time may need to be devoted to this area.
The third objective component of a fee involves 
certain direct and overhead expenses. Direct expenses are 
such items as out-of-town travel, hotel accommodations, 
meals, and business telephone calls. These are types of 
expenses which might arise if an auditor is required to 
go out of town on a client's engagement. Generally, these 
items are included in the client's fee. Overhead expenses 
are those expenses of the firm which help the firm to 
operate a going practice. These items include rent,
^Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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telephone, insurance, office supplies, office equipment 
depreciation, and any time of the partners which is non- 
chargeable to a given client. The total of all these items 
is applied to the clients on the basis that these expenses 
are necessary to keep the firm operating and available to 
render services to all of the clients. The basis for 
application of overhead costs to each client might employ 
an hourly burden rate. This hourly burden rate would be 
derived by dividing the total overhead cost by the total 
number of hours chargeable to clients for a given year. A 
better method, however, would be to charge each client with 
overhead depending upon the level of work done. In other 
words, work done by the junior staff member as opposed to 
work done by a partner would carry a lower overhead charge 
per hour.^
In the final analysis, a fee is objectively based
on the amount of time spent by the staff and partners on
the engagement. The time value of a fee can be expressed
as composed of a labor rate, the difficulty of a job and
7
the ability of the staff man. In addition, another part 
of the fee is the result of an allocated portion of over­
head .
6Ibid., p. 115.
7
Eder, "A Three-Step Method of Arriving at a Fair
Fee," p . 28.
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The Subjective Portion of a Fee
The subjective portion of a fee is based upon a 
determination of what is of value to a client. The techni­
cal importance of the work done for a client, the impor­
tance of the services rendered to the client, the personal 
judgment factor of the accountant, and the extent of con­
venience extended to the client are the major factors which 
cause a fee to have a certain portion which is subjectively 
determined.
What are the elements of value that are looked for 
in an engagement? There are three general groups of the 
elements of value to a client. There are those elements 
which can be rewarded through a person's salary and keyed 
into a rate based upon time spent on an engagement. There 
are value elements which come from an accountant's techni­
cal achievements. These achievements may only be par­
tially rewarded through a salary and are directly related 
to an accountant's skill and experience. Finally, there 
are those elements of value to a client which have little 
or nothing to do with the amount of time spent by the
g
accountant on a particular engagement.
Keeping in mind the idea of value, it is important 
to realize that the fee may be based to a large extent on
g
W. H. Morgan, "The Subjective Elements in a Fee," 
The Accountants' Journal (New Zealand), Vol. 52 (April,
1974), p. 345.
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the technical importance of the work done for the client. 
What the level of technical importance is will be deter­
mined by relating the following six factors:
1. Level of work performed;
2. Sufficiency of records which support the 
work;
3. Proposed uses of the completed reports;
4. Dollar amounts involved;
5. Rules, regulations or requirements demanded 
by government agencies; and
6. Liability of the accountant to outside 
third parties.
The level of technical importance will have much to do with 
the size of the fee. Especially when considering the 
potential liability of accountants to third parties, it 
can be seen that a fee could be high. It is only reason­
able that the fee charged would bear some relation to the 
risk involved, as well as to the importance of the services 
rendered.^
How does one determine the value or importance of 
the services rendered to a client? Many accountants use 
as an indication of value the savings that are made for 
the client as a result of the services. If considerable 
savi'ngs are shown to be achieved through the design and
9
Ibid.
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installation of a new accounting system, or through the 
reduction of operating costs, or through savings in income 
taxes, this can bear a direct relation to a measure of the 
value of the services to the client. This may give a 
good indication of the fee to be charged.
A further subjective component of any fee is the 
personal judgment of the accountant. In numerous situa­
tions, doing the correct thing may not be nearly as impor­
tant as first being able to determine the correct course 
of action. This may require very little time, but in the 
judgment of the accountant, may be extremely valuable to 
the client. In determining the value of services to a 
client and using one's judgment, an accountant must con­
sider the following three factors:
1. The intrinsic value to the client of the 
work performed
2. The degree of success in attaining the 
purpose for which the work was required
3. The purpose itself.H
By evaluating these three factors, an accountant can exer­
cise his professional judgment in determining some portion 
of a client's fee.
Still another subjective component of a fee is the 
convenience to a client. It is hard to quantify this com­
ponent, but it must be given some weight in determining a
11
Ibid.
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fee. When meetings are conducted in the accountant's
office rather than on the premises of the client, the fees
may be lower since a trip out of the office was avoided.
Another facet of convenience to the client deals with when
he requires his work to be done. If the work must be
accomplished during a period of time when there is already
an overload, rather than in a slack period, the fee to the
12client may be higher.
Factors Leading to Fee Revision
The basic fee to a client is made up of the objec­
tive portion and the subjective portion discussed above. 
Once the basic fee is established, what factors can cause 
a fee to be revised? Generally fees are increased when a 
fee revision is contemplated. The reasons cited most 
often for an increase are the general economic environ­
ment, the long time elapsed since a prior fee adjustment, 
increased involvement in a client's affairs, and a change
in a client's ownership structure, or diversification of
13a client's business interests.
The general economic environment has been one of 
inflation over the past several years. This upward trend
12Ibid., p. 346.
Bernard B. Eder, "Fee Increases: When, How
Much, and How?" The Practical Accountant, Vol. 7 (July/ 
August, 1974), p. 26.
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has caused increases in payroll expenses, fringe benefits,
rent and all other costs of operating a business. This
14will create the need to revise a client's fee.
In the case where a client has been receiving the 
services of an accounting firm for a number of years, it 
may have been a long time since any increase in fees has 
occurred. By comparing the increased cost of doing busi­
ness with the situation that existed when a fee was ini­
tially established, the accountant may find it necessary
. 15to revise a fee.
In many situations it becomes necessary for the 
accountant to become more involved in a client's business 
affairs. This may be due to new regulations of the govern­
ment, to an increase in the volume of the client's busi­
ness, or to an expanding of the facilities of a client and 
the need to modernize his accounting system. The evolve- 
ment of more complex accounting requirements within the 
accounting profession may cause increased involvement on
the part of the accountant in a client's affairs. This
16increased involvement can lead to a fee increase.
When a client's business undergoes a change in 
structure, either through a change in ownership or a change
14Ibid., p. 28.
15
Ibid.
^Ibid.
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in the overall composition of the business, it is necessary 
for the accountant to devote more time to that client's 
particular problems. More research and management advis­
ory services may be needed. This additional activity can 
cause a client's fee to increase.x ^
To determine a fee that is both reasonable and 
appropriate for each client, the accountant and the client 
need to remember the following key factors:
1. An auditor who has an adequate organization 
to perform the examination should be se­
lected. An adequate organization would in­
clude auditors, specialists and office 
clerical staff.
2. The competence of the auditor's personnel
and their ability to perform an audit of
proper scope and in an economical manner 
should be reviewed.
3. The auditor should understand who the client
is, the purpose of the examination, and
with whom the arrangements are to be made.
Written evidence should be made of these 
understandings.
4. The audit work to be performed should be 
planned and target dates set for the com­
pletion of specific phases of the audit.
5. Company [client's] personnel should be used 
for routine work where possible.
6. The auditor should discuss his findings as 
well as problem areas such as statement 
presentations and the wording of his opinion, 
with the president of the company.
7. Problems encountered during the audit should 
be reviewed and solutions should be found 
that will facilitate the audit of the fol­
lowing year.
8. Fees should be reviewed, especially when in­
creases are proposed and they should be
17
Ibid.
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compared with fees of other auditors, and 
those paid by comparable companies.
9. Separate detailed billings for special work 
and services performed outside the scope 
of the audit should be requested.
10. Management should maintain an annual review 
of the trend in audit fees, keeping in mind 
the growth of the company and the complex­
ity of the business.18
Having examined the various aspects of determining 
a fee, what is the disadvantage of a policy of rotation of 
auditors as it affects fees? Basically, rotation of 
auditors is opposed because the use of new auditors on a 
job is more costly to the client than the use of the prior 
year's auditing firm. The fee for an initial audit of a 
client by an auditing firm is generally higher than for 
subsequent audits. This is due to the time involved. It 
has been estimated that it costs twice as much to perform 
the first audit as it does to carry out subsequent
-4. 19audits.
The adverse effect which rotation of auditors has 
on a client's fee is closely tied to the adverse effect 
on another area— time.
Effect on Time
When a new auditor begins working with a client, 
he requires a great deal of time to gather a large amount
18Thomas Fee, "Controlling the Audit Fee," Manage­
ment Accounting, Vol. 56 (February, 1975), p. 49.
19N. Loyall McLaren, "Rotation of Auditors," The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 106 (July, 1958), p. 43.
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of information. This process is extremely time consum­
ing .
Whenever an auditor is engaged by a client, he 
must plan his time in order to meet an important deadline. 
This deadline is the date set for making available to the 
board of directors and the stockholders the published 
financial statements. As a result of the additional time 
required to gather information on a first audit, the audi­
tor may find himself pushed in terms of time available to 
get everything done. As a result of the time pressure, 
the auditor may not be able to perform the audit as 
thoroughly as it should be done. An auditor who has worked 
with the client in the past can generally make better use 
of the time available, especially in the areas of review­
ing internal control, testing and discovering problems
20which need to be investigated.
The overall effect on time of adopting a policy of 
rotation of auditors is to cause a greater amount of time 
to be spent on each new audit. Whenever a new firm of 
auditors is engaged by the client, this will cause more 
time to be spent by the auditors in gathering essential 
data, as well as more time to be spent by the client in 
supplying the needed data to a new firm of auditors.
Robert K. Mautz, "Rotation of Auditors," Finan­
cial Executive, Vol. 42 (July, 1974), p. 52.
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Rotation of auditors will result in added costs to both the 
client and the auditor simply as a result of the additional 
time necessary on an initial audit. This effect on time 
involved ties directly in with the effect on fees previ­
ously discussed.
The third major area which is affected by the in­
stallation of new auditors in a client’s business is effi­
ciency.
Effect on Efficiency 
The installation of new auditors can have adverse 
effects on the level of efficiency achieved during an 
audit engagement. When new auditors come into a client's 
office, it takes time to become acquainted with new pro­
cedures as well as with the client's personnel. Gaining 
certain necessary data may rely on successful communication 
with the client's staff. A new auditor may find it diffi­
cult at first to gain the complete cooperation of the 
client's staff. It is only human for this to happen. It 
takes time for the new auditor to get to know and communi­
cate well with the client and his personnel. This failure
to cooperate fully with a new auditor can cause the audi-
21tor's efficiency to be diminished.
McLaren, "Rotation of Auditors," p. 43.
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The level of efficiency at which an auditor per­
forms on a given audit is related to the amount of knowl­
edge which the auditor possesses about the client. When a 
new firm of auditors is installed, this level of efficiency 
is drastically reduced simply because the fund of previous 
knowledge about the client is zero. It takes time and 
effort to build up the knowledge as well as the level of 
efficiency in conducting an audit.
Not only the efficiency of the auditor but the 
overall efficiency of the client's business is affected 
when the auditors are new. It takes more time to give a 
new auditor the information he needs and to introduce him 
to the company procedures and personnel with whom he will 
be dealing. This time involved causes a disruption in 
the client's flow of work and consequently, an overall 
decrease in the effectiveness of the total operations of 
the client's business.
Even though a new auditor may bring new ideas into 
a client's office, it must be realized that a new auditor 
may also be less efficient and thorough. The installa­
tion of new auditors which would occur if a policy of 
rotation of auditors was adopted would cause many adverse 
effects for the clients as well as for the auditors.
These adverse effects are seen mainly as increased fees, 
increased time spent on audits, and a reduced level of 
overall efficiency.
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Experience and Information Loss 
from Previous Audits
The third disadvantage of rotation of auditors is 
the loss of experience and information from previous 
audits. This point is often discussed in the literature 
opposing a rotation policy. When a new auditor comes to 
a client, he has to build a fund of knowledge with regard 
to his client. He has lost the benefit which has been 
gained by the past auditor in terms of previous experience 
with the client and historical information upon which the 
past auditor would have been able to rely.
One way in which a new auditor might be able to
overcome this loss of experience and information from
previous audits is by relying on the work and reports of
the previous auditor. However, he cannot rely on this
previous work to the extent of accepting it at face value.
The new auditor must satisfy himself as to the beginning
account balances and as to the consistent application of
generally accepted accounting principles. Even though the
new auditor communicates with the predecessor auditor, the
new auditor cannot relieve himself of the responsibility
for the previous work simply by referring to the previous
22auditor's work and report.
22Dennis S. Neier, "Using the Work and Reports of
Other Auditors," The New York Certified Public Accountant,
Vol. 41 (October, 1971), p. 725.
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In October of 1975, the Auditing Standards Execu­
tive Committee issued Statement on Auditing Standards No. 7 
entitled "Communications Between Predecessor and Successor 
Auditors." This statement was issued as a means of pro­
viding the accounting profession with guidelines for com­
munication between a predecessor and a successor auditor. 
This statement discusses two types of communication. The 
first type of communication is communication before a suc­
cessor accepts the engagement, and the second is communi­
cation between a predecessor and a successor auditor after
23
acceptance of an engagement.
After an auditor accepts an engagement, the suc­
cessor auditor may find it necessary to inquire specific­
ally about items which he feels may affect the performance 
of his audit. Such items might include certain areas 
which need a great deal of time to explore or particular 
audit problems that materialized as a result of the cli­
ent's accounting system and records. In addition, the 
successor auditor may review the predecessor's working 
papers. The procedure for this step is clearly outlined 
in the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 7 as follows:
The successor auditor should request the cli­
ent to authorize the predecessor to allow a re­
view of the predecessor's working papers. It is
23Statement on Auditing Standards No. 7: Communi­
cations Between Predecessor and Successor Auditors (New 
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Inc., 1975), pp. 2-3.
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customary in such circumstances for the prede­
cessor auditor to make himself available to the 
successor auditor for consultation and to make 
available for review certain of his working 
papers. The predecessor and successor auditors 
should agree on those working papers that are 
to be made available for review and those that 
may be copied. Ordinarily, the predecessor 
should permit the successor to review working 
papers relating to matters of continuing ac­
counting significance, such as the working 
paper analysis of balance sheet accounts, both 
current and noncurrent, and those relating to 
contingencies.24
By following these guidelines, a successor auditor 
may be able to overcome some of the loss of information 
which is experienced when a change in auditors takes 
place. However, this communication will not completely 
make up for the loss of information and for the experience 
loss. The experience gained by a continuing relationship 
between an auditor and a client can be of invaluable bene­
fit to a client. A background of information and experi­
ence is built up between the client and the auditor which 
enables the auditor to offer sound advice about the
operations, procedures and controls of the client's opera- 
25tions.
The experience and information loss from previous 
audits which is a big disadvantage of a policy of rotating
24Ibid., p. 3.
25
Alan J. Winters, "Looking at the Auditor Rota­
tion Issue," Management Accounting, Vol. 57 (March, 
1976), p. 30.
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auditors is closely associated with a fourth disadvantage, 
the disruption of the services offered to a client.
Disruption of Services Offered 
to a Client
Another disadvantage that is often discussed in 
connection with the loss of experience and information is 
the general disruption of the services offered to a par­
ticular client.
Many clients do not want a change in the auditor
who performs their particular audit. They feel that the
experience and information gathered about the problems
and overall operations of the company enable the auditor
to conduct a better a”dit. In addition to performing a
better audit, the accountant is in a better position to
offer advice on taxes, system design, Securities and Ex-
2 6change Commission work and management advising.
The quality of the services rendered to a client 
could be less if auditors were rotated. The mere disrup­
tion of services, coupled with information and experience 
loss, could provide the client with a level of work of 
inferior quality rather than one of excellent quality, even 
though the audit and other services are conducted from a 
fresh point of view. The auditor who has had a long, con­
tinuous working relationship with a client is the one who
McLaren, "Rotation of Auditors," p. 43.
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is best capable of offering help and advice to management 
in all of the areas in which the accounting profession pro­
vides services, from auditing to management advisory ser­
vices. The disruption of these services for the client 
would hardly seem to serve much benefit.
Summary
When examining any proposal, it is necessary to 
discuss both the positive points and the negative points. 
This chapter has presented and discussed the disadvantages 
of adopting a policy of rotation of auditors within the 
profession. The first disadvantage is the loss of large 
clients by CPA firms. The second disadvantage is the ad­
verse effects which are experienced when new auditors are 
installed. These adverse effects are evident in the areas 
of fees, time, and efficiency. A third disadvantage is 
the loss of experience and information from previous 
audits. A fourth disadvantage is the disruption in the 
overall services which are offered to a client. Having 
discussed the advantages of rotation of auditors in the 
preceding chapter and the disadvantages of rotation of 
auditors in this chapter, the following chapter will pre­
sent the results of a survey in which the general prac­
tices of selecting, rotating, and retaining auditors are 
explored.
Chapter 4
THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES
This chapter presents the results of the question­
naires mailed to the controllers of the United States 
largest industrials and to CPA firms. As explained in 
Chapter 1, the questionnaire for controllers was mailed 
to each of the companies in the Fortune 500 listing. The 
questionnaire for CPA firms was mailed to a partner in the 
main office of each of the "Big 8" and "Big 7" firms.
This chapter will be divided into two main sec­
tions. The first section will discuss the results of the 
questionnaire to controllers. The second section will 
discuss the results of the questionnaire to CPA firms.
Responses of the Controllers
Of the 500 questionnaires which were sent to the 
controllers of the Fortune 500 companies, 339 responded, 
which was a 67.80% response rate. Of the 339, four com­
panies stated that they could not participate. Therefore, 
the following data which are presented are based on the 
335 useable responses.
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Selection of the Auditor 
The first three questions of the questionnaire 
dealt with the area of selection of the auditor. The 
first question asked whether the company had an audit com­
mittee. Of the 335 respondents, 315 (94.03%) companies 
indicated they did have an audit committee, while 20 
(5.97%) companies indicated they did not. The formation 
of audit committees to help the company deal with inde­
pendent auditors has received more and more attention over 
the last several years. It is not surprising that 94.03% 
of the respondent companies have audit committees. By 
June 30, 1978, all domestic companies who list their com­
mon stock on the New York Stock Exchange must have audit 
committees formed."*-
The second question asked whether the audit com­
mittee selected the outside CPA firm. Of the 335 respond­
ents, 193 (57.61%) said yes; 136 (40.60%) said no; a few 
(6, 1.79%) did not answer the question. Since one of the 
main functions of the audit committee is to help in se­
lecting the outside CPA firm, these results agree with most 
of the literature written on the functions of the audit 
committee.
R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann, Corporate Audit 
Committees; Policies and Practices (Altamonte Springs, 
Florida: The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc., 1977),
p. 19.
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The third question asked the respondent the fol­
lowing question: "If the answer to #2 is No, then who does
select the CPA firm to perform the annual audit?" This 
question, coupled with the previous question, caused many 
of the respondents to explain the selection process of 
the auditor in which the company engaged. Of the 193 re­
spondents who indicated that the audit committee selected 
the CPA firm, 29 of them also answered question 3 as a 
means of further explanation. The 136 who answered "no" 
to question 2 gave several different procedures followed 
for selecting the auditor in answer to question 3. Table 
1 on page 96 presents the various procedures of all of the 
335 respondents. As the table indicates, there are many 
different procedures for selecting the outside independ­
ent CPA firm to perform the annual audit.
Retention of the Auditor 
The results of question 4 showed a wide range of 
answers to the number of years that the present auditing 
firm had been auditing the company. There are 56 (16.72%) 
firms of the 335 respondents which have had the same audit­
ing firm for 50 years or more. Table 2 on page 9 7 shows 
the overall responses of the companies to this question 
which range from less than one year to 80 years.
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Table 1
PROCEDURE FOR AUDITOR SELECTION
Procedure Number Percent
Board of Directors recommends; Stock­
holders approve 
Management recommends; Board of 
Directors selects 
Shareholders select 
Board of Directors selects 
Management selects
Management recommends; Stockholders 
ratify
Management and audit committee select 
Management recommends to audit com­
mittee who recommends to Board of 
Directors who selects 
Management recommends to audit com­
mittee who recommends to Board of 
Directors who recommends to Stock­
holders who approve 
Executive committee selects 
Parent company selects 
Audit committee recommends to Board 
of Directors who select 
Controller selects with the approval 
of the audit committee 
Audit committee recommends to Board 
of Directors who approve and 
present the selection to the 
Stockholders for final approval 
Audit committee recommends; Stock­
holders approve 
Audit committee selects 
No method stated other than "not the 
audit committee"
No answer
15
5
22
25
9
2.
13
1
1
1
21
1
27
20
164
1
6
4.48
1.49
6. 57
7. 46 
2.68
0.60
3.88
0. 30
0. 30 
0.30 
0. 30
6. 27
0.30
8. 06
5. 97 
48. 95
0.30
1.79
Total 335 100.00
Table 2
RETENTION OF THE PRESENT AUDITING FIRM
Years Companies Years Companies Years Companies Years Companies
Retained # oo Retained # o"O Retained # o,o Retained # g,o
Less than 1 13 3. 88 21 2 0.60 42 0 0. 00 63 0 0.00
1 6 1. 79 22 3 0.90 43 1 0. 30 64 0 0. 00
2 4 1.19 23 2 0.60 44 2 0.60 65 1 0. 30
3 6 1. 79 24 2 0.60 45 9 2.68 66 0 0.00
4 4 1.19 25 28 8.36 46 1 0.30 67 1 0.30
5 6 1.79 26 1 0. 30 47 0 0 .  00 68 1 0. 30
6 1 0. 30 27 3 0.90 48 3 0. 90 69 0 0.00
7 4 1.19 28 5 1.49 49 0 0. 00' 70 4 1.19
8 4 1.19 29 1 0. 30 50 23 6.86 71 1 0. 30
9 3 0. 90 30 31 9.25 51 1 0. 30 72 0 0.00
10 18 5.36 31 2 0.60 52 2 0.60 73 1 0.30
11 3 0. 90 32 1 0. 30 53 0 0 .  00 74 0 0.00
12 4 1.19 33 3 0.90 54 1 0. 30 75 3 0. 90
13 2 0.60 34 3 0.90 55 0 0 .  00 76 0 0 .  00
14 3 0.90 35 7 2. 08 56 1 0. 30 77 1 0. 30
15 18 5. 36 36 1 0. 30 57 1 0.30 78 0 0 .  00
16 2 0.60 37 1 0. 30 58 2 0.60 79 0 0 .  00
17 4 1.19 38 1 0. 30 59 1 0. 30 80 2 0.60
18 3 0.90 39 0 0.00 60 6 1.79 No useable
19 0 0 .  00 40 20 5.97 61 1 0.30 answer 7 2.08
20 30 8.95 41 1 0.30 62 2 0.60
Total 335 100.00
i£>
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Rotation of the Auditor 
The remaining questions on the questionnaire ex­
plored the present practices of the companies as to the 
rotation of auditing firms as well as the opinions of the 
controllers concerning the rotation of auditors.
The fifth and sixth questions asked the company 
whether it changed auditing firms on a regular basis and 
if so, how often. Of the 335 respondents, 327 (97.61%) 
answered no; 5 (1.49%) answered yes; and 3 (0.90%) gave 
no answer. Of the five that answered yes, two companies 
indicated that they changed auditing firms every 3 to 5 
years; two companies changed auditing firms on a basis of 
more than 5 years; and one firm gave no answer as to how 
frequently a change took place.
The seventh question asked the controller whether 
he felt that an auditor may become lax in his approach to 
the audit engagement of the same company over a period of 
years. A majority of the respondents, 290 (86.57%), felt 
that this would not be a problem. Only 36 (10.75%) agreed 
that this might be a problem. There were 9 (2.68%) who 
gave no answer.
The eighth question asked the controller for his 
opinion concerning an auditor's independence after being 
with the same corporation for a period of years. There 
were 306 (91.34%) respondents who felt that an auditor 
would not be considered less than independent after a
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period of years with the same client-corporation. Only 24 
(7.17%) felt that there would be a problem concerning the 
auditor's independence. Five respondents (1.49%) gave no 
answer.
The ninth and tenth questions were related. The 
controller was asked whether he favored a policy of auto­
matically changing independent auditing firms on a routine 
basis. If he answered yes, he was asked how often they 
should be changed. The results of this question show that 
an overwhelming number of respondents (322, 96.12%) are 
against this policy. A small number (10, 2.99%) are in 
favor of the policy. A few respondents (3, 0.89%) failed 
to answer the question. Of the 10 who answered that they 
did favor a policy of automatically changing independent 
auditing firms on a routine basis, 4 respondents favored a 
policy of changing every 3 to 5 years and 6 respondents 
favored a policy of using a basis of more than 5 years.
The eleventh and twelfth questions explored the con­
trollers' feelings about whether by changing auditors on a 
routine basis, they felt the company would be provided 
with a more objective evaluation of their accounting sys­
tem and financial statements. The respondents were asked 
to explain why they felt as they did. The majority of the 
respondents (310, 92.54%) did not fe6l that a change in 
auditors would provide a company with a more objective 
evaluation. Only 18 (5.37%) respondents felt that by
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changing auditors, a more objective evaluation would be 
achieved. Seven (2.09%) respondents gave no answer. When 
asked why they felt as they did, the 310 respondents, who 
answered no to the preceding question, gave several differ­
ent reasons. These reasons are presented in Table 3 on 
page 101. The results agree with several of the disadvan­
tages of the rotation of auditors which were discussed in 
Chapter 3.
The following responses are representative of the 
type of opinions which are grouped in Table 3 as "other 
comments":
The objective evaluation of an accounting sys­
tem depends on the ability and integrity of the 
accounting firm performing the audit. This is 
not necessarily improved by routine rotation.
The professional auditor is objective by 
definition - if this were to be questioned, then 
the entire system should be discarded.
CPA firms are no different than other profes­
sionals. Should people change doctors (M.D.'s) 
or lawyers periodically? Change does not insure 
objectivity.
There were a total of 18 (5.37%) respondents who 
agreed that changing auditors was worthwhile. Their main 
reason for agreeing was that they felt that rotation would 
provide a greater degree of independence and a fresh point 
of view. Of the 18 respondents, 11 (61.11%) stated this 
opinion. The remaining 7 (38.89%) respondents expressed
their opinions a little differently. The following four 
opinions express some of the areas of concern which arise
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Table 3
VIEWS EXPRESSED AGAINST ROTATION
View Number Percent
Auditors rotate within the firm on a 
job and supply a fresh point of 
view, maintain their independence 
and overcome the problem of lax­
ness
Rotation would require too much time 
and money to be spent educating 
a new auditing firm to the pro­
cedures of the company
A higher quality audit is performed by 
an auditing firm who has a complete 
understanding of the company and 
can provide the insight of many 
years of association with the com­
pany and its problems. Continuity 
is more valuable than change.
The professional standards of the
accounting profession and the pos­
sibility of peer reviews as well 
as pressure of potential litiga­
tion are enough to assure independ­
ence and a high quality audit.
Other comments
No opinion
Total
132
29
54
6
46
43
310
42. 58
9. 35
17. 42
1. 94 
14.84 
13.87 
100.00
when auditing firms continue in long associations with 
clients:
Work becomes routine; opinions are formed 
over a period of time that could tend to 
limit objectivity.
Normally a firm becomes stale in their 
approach if they remain too long. They begin 
to assume too much and become comfortable 
with the client's staff.
A CPA firm would tend to be more assertive 
in its observation if it knew another firm 
would be "looking over their shoulders" the 
next year or so.
. Currently, I think managements have a 
tendency to influence auditing firms, pri­
marily because of the revenues involved to 
the auditing firms.
The opinions of the 18 respondents who favored rotation ex­
press several of the advantages of rotation of auditors 
which were discussed in Chapter 2.
The last specific question of the survey asked the 
respondent to answer the following: "Do you foresee any
change which your corporation will make in the future with 
regard to the policy of selecting the independent CPA 
firm?" The majority of the respondents (295, 88.06%) re­
plied no; 25 (7.46%) replied yes; and 15 (4.48%) gave no 
answer. Of the 25 respondents who indicated a change in 
the future, some further explained what the change might be. 
Two of these possible changes were given as follows:
If the authorities and the public continue to 
question independence of CPAs, some rotation of 
firms probably will be required.
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It's possible that we would consider throw­
ing the audit open to bid each 5 years or so to 
ensure price competitiveness.
The final part of the questionnaire invited the re­
spondents to make additional comments. Of the 335 respond­
ents, only 17 (5.07%) participated further. All of the 17 
respondents were opposed to a policy of rotation of audi­
tors. Two comments in particular summarize the majority 
viewpoint which does not favor a policy of rotation of audi­
tors. One controller remarked:
Rotation of firms is expensive and not the 
answer. The answer is the background and 
capability of the audit partner and of the 
staff. The second answer is to have a well- 
trained, well qualified, well-paid accounting 
department. Management cannot escape respon­
sibility by blaming auditors.
Another controller concluded:
Companies that use the services of small 
firms might do well to change (rotate) auditors 
from time to time since smaller auditing firms 
may not be able to rotate personnel on the 
account so easily. The pressure (presumably 
coming from the government regulatory agencies 
and possibly academia) to have mandatory rota­
tion of independent public accountants smacks 
of the usual unfortunate suspicions that the 
"public sector" seem to harbour with respect to 
the "private sector." It completely ignores 
the fact that the major characteristic, other 
than competence, that public accountants have 
to offer is integrity and independence. It is 
in their own best interests to maintain that 
posture and the good ones do. The costs of re­
placing auditors because of the time it takes 
for new firms to become acquainted with individ­
ual company procedures more than offsets the 
potential benefit to shareholders - and the pub­
lic - unless there have been some "sweetheart" 
deals - but sweetheart deals are not in the 
best interest in the long run of the accounting
104
firms. Furthermore, auditing firms who know 
the business and the client and are still inde­
pendent are more likely to be of greater help 
to their client by virtue of their superior 
knowledge of the company.
Cross Analyses 
Some interesting cross analyses follow. Of the 328 
(97.91%) respondents who indicated the number of years that 
the present auditing firm had been auditing the company,
319 of those answered whether or not they felt that an 
auditor may become lax in his approach to the audit engage­
ment of the same company over a period of years. Of the 
319, 284 (89.03%) felt that this would not occur. However, 
35 (10.97%) indicated that laxness might occur. Table 4 
on page 105 shows how many years the same firm has audited 
the company where the controller felt that laxness might 
have occurred. It is interesting to note that the remain­
ing 284 respondents to the question dealing with an audi­
tor's laxness have had the same auditing firm for periods of 
less than a year up to periods of 80 years. No respondent 
whose company has had the same auditing firm for more than 
52 years, i.e., 30 companies, felt that laxness was a 
problem.
Another cross analysis was drawn between the number 
of years that the same auditing firm had been auditing the 
company and the opinion of the controller as to whether the 
auditor may be considered to be less than independent after 
a period of years. Although 24 (7.16%) respondents of the
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Table 4
YEARS OF SERVICE BY SAME FIRM COUPLED 
WITH POSSIBLE LAXNESS
Years of Service
Number of Controllers Who 
Feel Laxness May Become a 
Problem 
Number Percent
Less than 1 Year 3 8. 57
1 2 5.71
10 1 2.86
15 2 5. 71
18 1 2.86
20 2 5.71
25 4 11.42
26 1 2.86
28 1 2.86
29 1 2.86
30 3 8. 57
32 1 2.86
34 1 2.86
38 1 2. 86
40 3 8. 57
45 1 2. 86
48 1 2. 86
50 5 14.28
52 1 2. 86
Total 35 100.00
106
335 felt that independence might be a problem, only 23 of 
these gave an answer as to how many years the same firm had 
been auditing the company. Table 5 on page 107 summarizes 
the results of this cross analysis. As in the previous 
cross analysis, the majority of the firms feel that after 
a period of years with the same corporation, an auditor 
will not be considered less than independent. Even the 30 
companies who have had their same auditing firm in excess 
of 52 years do not feel that the independence issue is a 
problem.
Responses of the CPAs 
A questionnaire was mailed to one partner in the 
main office of each of the accounting firms known as the 
"Big 8" and the "Big 7." The response rate of the question­
naire was 66.67%, totaling 10 useable responses.
Selection of the Auditor 
The first four questions of the CPA questionnaire 
dealt with the area of selection of the auditing firm.
The first question asked what percentage of the corpora­
tions that the CPA firm audited had audit committees. Of 
the 10 respondents, 2 (20%) said 50%; 1 (10%) said 5%;
1 (10%) said 20%; 1 (10% said less than 1%; and 1 (10%) 
indicated that more than 80% of his clients had audit com­
mittees. Four (40%) respondents stated that no information 
was available in answer to this question.
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Table 5
YEARS OF SERVICE BY SAME FIRM COUPLED WITH 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE
Number of Controllers Who 
Feel Loss of Independence 
May Become a Problem 
Years of Service Number Percent
than 1 Year 3 13.04
1 1 4.35
2 1 4. 35
5 1 4 . 35
20 1 4. 35
25 3 13.04
30 2 8.69
32 1 4. 35
34 1 4.35
40 2 8.69
45 1 4. 35
48 1 4. 35
50 4 17.39
52 1 4.35
Total 23 100.00
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In the second question, the respondents were to in­
dicate whether or not the audit committee, if the company 
had one, selected the outside CPA firm. One (10%) re­
spondent indicated yes and 3 (30%) said no. The informa­
tion was unavailable from one respondent. The remaining 
5 (50%) gave the following explanations:
Two (20%) replied:
It [the audit committee] generally plays an 
important role.
Two (20%) said:
Some do; most do not.
One (10%) commented:
Seems to be a movement toward selection by 
audit committees.
The respondents were questioned next as to who did 
select the CPA firm in corporations that had audit commit­
tees but whose audit committee did not make the selection. 
Seven (70%) respondents who supplied information to this 
question outlined several methods of auditor selection.
One said the Board of Directors made the choice; two said 
management did; one said the Board of Directors or stock­
holders did. The remaining three gave the following re­
sponses :
Management recommends and the audit commit­
tee approves.
The chief executive officer selects with 
the approval of the Board of Directors.
The audit committee recommends but the 
Board of Directors appoints the auditor.
The other three respondents gave no answer to this question.
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The fourth question asked the respondents to indi­
cate who did select the CPA firm in corporations where 
there was no audit committee. Table 6 below summarizes 
the responses.
Table 6
PROCEDURES FOR AUDITOR SELECTION WHERE 
NO AUDIT COMMITTEE EXISTS
Procedure Number Percent
Chief Executive selects 3 30
Management, Board of Directors or 
Stockholders select 1 10
Management selects 3 30
Management or Board of Directors 
selects 2 20
No information available 1 10
Total 10 100
Rotation of Auditing Firms 
The next several questions explored the area of ro­
tation of auditing firms. The CPAs were asked whether 
their clients had a tendency to change auditing firms on 
a regular basis. All of the respondents indicated no. No 
client followed a policy of regularly changing or rotating 
the audit firm which performed the annual audit.
The CPAs were asked how often their clients change 
audit firms. Of the ten respondents, 4 (40%) stated a 
period of more than five years; 4 (40%) gave no answer, and 
1 (10%) stated that there was no found pattern.
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Rotation Practices Within Auditing Firms 
The next section of the questionnaire explored the 
practices of rotation which the CPA firms engaged in within 
their individual firms. There is a policy of rotating on 
a periodic basis the staff assistants on a given client's 
audit in 6 (60%) of the CPA firms surveyed. The remaining 
4 (40%) do not. Of the firms that do rotate staff assist­
ants, one does it every two years; two do it every five 
years; another does it every two to five years; one limits 
continuous service; and one firm gave no answer as to how 
often rotation occurs.
There are 6 (60%) of the CPA firms that follow a 
policy of rotating on a periodic basis the senior account­
ant on a given client's audit. Four (40%) do not. The 
six firms that have this policy rotate the senior account­
ant as follows: two said every 3 years; two said every 5
years; one said every 2 to 5 years; and one indicated 
limiting continuous service.
Those firms that follow a policy of rotating the 
manager in charge of a given client's audit number 6 (60%). 
Those that do not, number 4 (40%). Of the six that do, 
four indicated rotation every 5 years; one said every 3 
years; and one said every 3 to 5 years.
The pattern of responses to the preceding three 
sets of questions changes slightly with the next question. 
The question is as follows: "Is there a policy of rotating
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the partner in charge of a given client's audit?" Of the 
10 respondents, 8 (80%) said yes; 2 (20%) said no. Of the 
8 that said yes, 7 firms change the partner in charge 
every 5 years, and 1 firms changes every 5 to 7 years.
Views on Rotation of Auditing Firms 
The last part of the questionnaire sent to the 
CPAs asked several questions directed at determining their 
views on a policy of compulsory rotation of CPA firms 
among clients.
The first question posed was as follows: "In light
of the Metcalf Report and the proceedings of the Senate 
Subcommittee with regard to studying how to improve account­
ing and auditing, it is necessary for the accounting pro­
fession to take some measures toward self-regulation. With 
this in mind, do you feel that the future may hold a policy 
of compulsory rotation of CPA firms among clients?" Of the 
10 respondents, 2 (20%) said yes; 8 (80%) said no.
The next two questions asked the respondents whe­
ther they felt that such a policy would increase an audi­
tor's independence and would cause an auditor to be more 
objective in his dealings with clients. In answer to these 
two questions, 1 (10%) said yes, and 9 (90%) said no.
The final question asked the respondents to indi­
cate how they felt about a policy of rotating auditing firms 
among clients on a routine basis. The responses to this 
question are listed below:
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It would be expensive and counterproduc­
tive. Same result can be achieved by rotat­
ing people.
Doesn't make economic sense for any com­
pany - the extra cost of rotation will have 
to be passed on to all clients without appare- 
ent benefit.
Negative: too costly for client. Posi­
tive and better results can be obtained by 
rotating partners on the engagement.
Disagree. Increase costs without off­
setting benefits.
Opposed.
See no advantages. Whatever is proposed 
to be gained by rotating firms can be obtained 
as effectively and far more economically by 
other means.
Would be more costly and would not improve 
performance.
It would raise the costs and reduce the 
efficiency of audits and would increase audi­
tor independence only in appearance.
We believe such a policy would be counter­
productive .
Rotation of independent auditors among 
clients would not increase an auditor's inde­
pendence or objectivity; however, increasing 
responsibility for the independent auditors 
and their selection should be placed on the 
audit committee.
Summary and concluding remarks of this author are 
presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A brief summary of this study is given in this 
chapter. Concluding remarks follow this summary, as well 
as suggestions of areas for additional research.
Summary of This Study
The objectives of this study are threefold: (1) to
examine the advantages and disadvantages of the rotation of 
auditors, (2) to survey accountants in public practice and 
controllers in industry for their opinions on a policy of 
rotation of auditors, and (3) to examine the results of 
the survey and determine whether or not the accounting pro­
fession should adopt a policy requiring rotation of audi­
tors .
This study began with a literature search to deter­
mine what were considered to be the advantages and disad­
vantages of the rotation of auditors. The advantages of a 
policy of rotation of auditors are the maintenance of in­
dependence, the provision of a fresh point of view, and the 
possible reduction of litigation against accountants. The 
disadvantages of a policy of rotation are the possible loss 
of large clients by CPA firms, the adverse effects of
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installing new auditors, the experience and information 
loss from previous audits, and the disruption of services 
offered to a client. This discussion, presented in Chap­
ters 2 and 3, helped to clarify both sides of the issue of 
rotation of auditors, thereby accomplishing the first 
objective.
The results of a survey of accountants and con­
trollers were presented in Chapter 4, fulfilling the sec­
ond and third objectives. Two questionnaires, exploring 
the selection, rotation, and retention of independent audi­
tors, were sent— one to a group of accountants and another 
to a group of controllers. The controllers of the "Fortune 
50 0 companies" were asked to respond to one questionnaire. 
The total responses were 339, for a 67.8% response rate.
The group of accountants surveyed was composed of a partner 
in each of the main offices of the "Big 8" and the "Big 7" 
CPA firms. The total responses were ten, for a 66.67% 
response rate. The majority of the controllers (310 or 
92.54%) did not feel that by changing auditors on a routine 
basis, their company would be provided with a more objec­
tive evaluation of its accounting system and financial 
statements. The main reason for this response was that con­
trollers felt that rotation within the CPA firm provided a 
fresh point of view, maintained independence and reduced 
laxness on the part of the CPAs. The CPAs agreed with the 
controllers. Of the CPA respondents, nine (90%) did not
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feel that a policy of rotation would cause an auditor to be 
more objective in his dealings with clients. The main 
reason given by CPAs for opposing rotation is that they 
feel that such a procedure would be too costly and would 
be counterproductive.
Conclusions of This Study
The topic of rotation of auditors has long been a 
controversial issue. For more than twenty years, articles 
have appeared in various professional journals discussing 
the advantages and disadvantages of a policy of rotation 
of auditors. The concluding viewpoint of all of these 
articles is that rotation of auditors is not a reasonable 
procedure to be implemented within the accounting profes­
sion.
The recent interest which has been generated about 
the topic of rotation of auditors is a result of the inves­
tigation by the United States Senate Subcommittee on Re­
ports, Accounting and Management which published its find­
ings in March 1977. In the list of recommendations given 
in the study, the fourth recommendation discusses the pos­
sibility of mandatory rotation as follows:
Congress should consider methods of increasing 
competition among accounting firms for selection 
as independent auditors for major corporations. At 
present, a single accounting firm, nominated by 
management, is placed on the ballot of annual meet­
ings of stockholders. Domination of the corporate 
election process by large institutional investors 
and management ensures that the accounting firm
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nominated by management is elected. Long asso­
ciation between a corporation and an accounting 
firm may lead to such close identification of 
the accounting firm with the interests of its 
client's management that truly independent 
action by the accounting firm becomes diffi­
cult .
One alternative is mandatory change of 
accountants after a given period of years, or 
after any finding by the SEC that the account­
ing firm failed to exercise independent action 
to protect investors and the public.1
The current interest being exhibited regarding the 
regulation of the accounting profession by the SEC, the 
government and the profession itself would possibly cause 
the profession and the business world to consider a policy 
of rotation of auditors, that is, auditing firms. The 
results of the empirical research done in this study indi­
cate however that neither the largest representative firms 
of the accounting profession, the "Big 8" and the "Big 7," 
nor the controllers of the largest United States industrial 
companies are receptive to a policy of mandatory rotation 
of auditors. Only 5.37% (18) of the controllers felt that 
a policy of rotation would provide auditors who would 
achieve a more objective evaluation of their company, by 
providing a fresh point of view and a greater degree of 
independence from management. Only one CPA felt that a
1
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government 
Operations, The Accounting Establishment: A Staff Report,
S. Doc. No. 95-34, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1977),
p. 21.
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policy of rotation would cause an auditor to be more ob­
jective in his dealings with clients. Both sets of re­
spondents, the controllers and the CPAs, feel that manda­
tory rotation would be too costly and disruptive. The 
majority of opinions from both groups indicate that another 
method other than mandatory rotation can be used to achieve 
greater independence and a fresh, more objective point, of 
view. They are satisfied with the current practice of 
internal rotation of accountants working on a client's 
audit that is presently practiced by CPA firms.
While the practice of internal staff rotation is 
part of a plan of self-regulation for the profession, this 
author feels that this practice falls short of the type of 
regulation which the United States Senate Subcommittee on 
Reports, Accounting and Management is suggesting. Although 
mandatory rotation is only one possibility of regulating 
the profession, it is a possibility which should be given 
greater attention by the business sector and the profes­
sion. The business sector and the accounting profession 
cannot ignore such a policy as rotation of auditors simply 
because it is, in their opinion, basically too expensive 
to institute.
Areas for Additional Research
In examining the policy of rotation of auditors as 
a means of self-regulation by the accounting profession, it 
becomes evident that this is still a very controversial
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topic. Even though the business sector and the profession 
are against the policy of mandatory rotation, this does 
not mean that such a policy may not be adopted in the
future. The pressures from the government and society in
general are being brought to bear on the accounting pro­
fession, as well as the business sector, with regard to 
accounting practices and procedures. These pressures can­
not be ignored. The accounting profession may find itself 
adopting a policy of mandatory rotation of auditors as a 
result of a ruling by the SEC or by Congress. The account­
ing profession should open its eyes to such a possibility 
rather than assuming that the policy of mandatory rotation 
will fade away simply because the accounting profession is 
against it.
In several recent articles published in profes­
sional journals and newsletters, the idea of self­
regulation by the accounting profession has been discussed. 
Wallace Olson, president of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, in a recent article in the
Journal of Accountancy, discussed the new division of firms 
within the AICPA and the range of sanctions that can be 
imposed on those firms. However, he also pointed out the 
problem facing the profession in the following comments:
To sum up, the outlook is for more discipli­
nary machinery, not less. The question of whe­
ther a new federal regulatory scheme will be 
established through legislation hangs in the bal-
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ance, pending an appraisal of the effective­
ness of the AICPA division of firms.
It will be a major achievement if the 
profession's actions toward self-regulation 
prove to be successful in convincing its 
critics that additional governmental regula­
tion is unnecessary.2
Recent statements by SEC chairman Harold Williams 
indicate that the matter of the accounting profession's 
practices and procedures are becoming of more and more in­
terest to the SEC. Mr. Williams has been stressing the 
need for stronger internal auditors as well as stronger 
audit committees. With regard to self-regulation by the 
accounting profession, Mr. Williams recently issued a re­
port to the U. S. Congress on the profession's efforts in 
this area. In a recent meeting with the AICPA council,
Mr. Williams stated that the profession's program would be 
examined by looking at the issues of independence, quality 
control, including self-discipline, and the accounting and 
auditing standard-setting process. In his opinion, the 
profession's program can satisfy Congress and the SEC pro­
vided that the public oversight board, established in the
3
AICPA self-regulatory program, is truly independent.
Wallace E. Olson, "How Should a Profession Be 
Disciplined?" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 145 (May, 
1978), pp. 65-66.
3
"SEC Chairman's Report to Congress," The Journal
of Accountancy, Vol. 146 (July, 1978), p. 3.
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Further possibility of regulation imposed upon the
profession is evidenced by the recent bill introduced into
the House of Representatives by Representative John E.
Moss. The bill would establish a National Organization of
SEC Accountancy. The organization would have a five person
SEC appointed board which would investigate auditors and
take disciplinary action against auditing firms and indi-
4
vidual auditors. If this bill is passed, the regulatory 
pressures felt by the accounting profession will be even 
greater than before.
It would be better for the accounting profession to 
implement a policy of rotation of auditors voluntarily 
rather than have such a policy imposed upon the profession 
by an outside agency, be it the United States Congress or 
the SEC. Further discussion and research is needed in the 
area of the applicability of a rotation policy to the busi­
ness sector as well as in the area of the actual implemen­
tation of a policy of mandatory rotation.
Research efforts should be directed toward investi­
gating any effort at rotation of auditing firms which have 
been instituted to determine what the result of such plans 
have been. Even though the research which was done by 
this author did not indicate any such plans for rotation
4
"Moss Proposes a 'National Organization of SEC
Accountancy,1" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 146 (July,
1978), p. 3. . -
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being considered by the large industrials, it is possible
that such rotation policies are carried out by smaller
companies. Some cities have policies for rotating the
auditing firm which audits their city government agencies.
The City of Wichita in Kansas has a policy of rotating the
auditing firm every three years, which has been carried
5
out successfully for several years. By examining the 
policies of rotation of auditors by city governments, re­
search may reveal ways in which a mandatory system of ro­
tation of auditors could be effectively implemented by 
the accounting profession.
5
"Rotation and Selection of External Auditing 
Firms," The Internal Auditor (November/December, 1973), 
p . 94.
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APPENDIX A
The Questionnaires
Appendix A presents the questionnaires mailed in 
this study. It contains the transmittal letters to the 
controllers and the CPAs, and the two questionnaires that 
were sent to the controllers and the CPAs.
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MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY 131
C olleg e  of B u s in es s  A d m in is t r a t io n — B A  200
M EM PHIS, TEN N ESSEE 38152
D e p a r tm e n t  of A c c o u n ta n c y
February 27, 1978
Dear Controller:
The improving of accounting and auditing for all clients is a com­
mon goal of all professional accountants. Recently there has been a 
great deal of concern about federal controls being placed on the pro­
fession as a way to improve accounting and auditing.
In an effort to determine ways in which the accounting profession 
can provide better service to its clients without federal intervention, 
my doctoral dissertation from Louisiana State University is exploring 
the area of "Selection, Rotation and Retention of Independent Auditors." 
Since the opinions of those who use independent auditors will have a 
tearing on the future of the profession, I must ccme to you to ask 
your opinion on this topic. By answering the enclosed questionnaire 
you will be supplying important information as to whether the users of 
independent auditors feel that services to their firm might be improved.
Your individual responses to the questions will be kept confidential. 
The number on the questionnaire is for follow-up purposes only. A return, 
postage-paid envelope is enclosed for your convenience.
If you would kindly take the time now frcm your busy schedule and 
answer the enclosed questionnaire and return it before March 15, 1978,
I would greatly appreciate your time and effort.
Sincerely,
Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins 
Assistant Professor of 
Accountancy
SCD./ds
ENCLOSURE
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A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE 
SELECTION, ROTATION AND RETENTION OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
1. Does your corporation have an audit ccntittee? Yes No___
2. Does tne audit ccrrriittee select the outside C.P.A. firm? Yes No
3. If the answer to #2 is Mo, then who does select the C.P.A. firm to perform the 
annual audit?
4. How long has the present auditing firm been auditing your corporation?  years
5. Does your corporation change auditing firms on a regular basis? Yes No___
6. If yes, how regularly? Every 1-2 years? ________
Every 3-5 years? ________
More than 5 years _______
7. Do you feel that an auditor may became lax in his approach to the audit engage­
ment of the same company ever a pericd of years? Yes No ___
3. Do you feel that after a pericd of years with the same corporation as a client, 
an auditor may be considered less than independent? Yes  No ___
-N.
9. Do you favor a policy of automatically changing independent, auditing firms on 
a routine basis? Yes No
10. If yes, hew often should they be changed? Every 1-2 years? ______
3-5 years? ______
More than 5 years? ____
11. Do you feel that by changing auditors on a routine basis your corporation would 
be provided with a more objective evaluation of your accounting system and 
financial statements? Yes  No ___
12. V.hy do you feel as you do?
13. Do ycu foresee any chance which your corporation will make in the future with 
recard to the policy of selecting tne independent C.P.A. firm?
14. Please 'use the back of this page to make any further cawnents.
Return to: Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins, Department of Accountancy, Rocm 200, College of
Business Administration, Mer.chis State University, Manonis, Tennessee 
38152
i
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D e p a r tm e n t  of A c co u n ta n cy
March 10, 1978
Dear CPA:
The improving of accounting and auditing for all clients 
is a common goal of all professional accountants. Recently there 
has been a great deal of concern about federal controls being placed 
on the profession as a way to improve accounting and auditing.
In an effort to determine ways in which the accounting pro­
fession can provide better service to its clients without federal 
intervention, my doctoral dissertation from Louisiana State Universi­
ty is exploring the area of "Selection, Rotation and Retention of 
Independent Auditors." Since the opinions of those who render ser­
vices to clients will determine the future actions of the profession 
as a whole, I must ccme to you to ask your opinion on this topic.
By answering the enclosed questionnaire you will be supplying import­
ant information as to how services to clients can be better improved.
Your individual responses to the questions will be kept 
confidential. The number on the questionnaire is for follow-up pur­
poses only. A return, postage-paid envelope is enclosed for your 
convenience.
If you would kindly take the time now from your busy 
schedule and answer the enclosed questionaire and return it before 
April 1, 1978. I would greatly appreciate your time and effort.
Sincerely,
Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins 
Assistant Professor of 
Accountancy
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A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE 
SELECTION, ROTATION AND RETENTION OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
1. What percentage of the corporations that you audit have audit committees?______
2. In the corporations that have audit ccnmittees, dees the audit oonmittee select the
outside independent C.P.A. firm to perform the annual audit? Yes No_____
3. If the answer to #2 is No, who does select the outside C.P.A. firm?_______________
4. In corporations that do not have an audit committee, who selected your firm as the
independent C.P.A. firm?___________________________________________________
5. Do your clients have a tendency to change auditing*firms on a regular basis?
Yes__________________ No________________
6. If yes, how many clients follow a policy of regularly changing or rotating the
audit firm which performs their annual audit?______________
7. How often do your clients change audit firms? Every 1-2 years?________
, . Every 3-5 years?______
More than 5 years?_______
8. Within your C.P.A firm, is there a policy of rotating on a periodic basis the staff
assistants on a given client's audit? Yes_______No________
9. If so, how often?______________
10. Is there a policy of rotating on a periodic basis the senior accountant on a given
client's audit? Yes________No__________
11. If so, how often?
12. Is there a policy of rotating the manager in charge of a given client's audit?
Yes___________No___________
13. If so, hew often?___________________
14. Is there a policy of rotating the partner in charge of a given client's audit?
Yes_______ N o ___________
15. If so, how often?__________________
16. In light of the Metcalf Report and the proceedings of the Senate Subcommittee with
regard to studying how to improve accounting and auditing, it is necessary for the 
accounting profession to take seme measures toward self-regulation. With this in
mind, do you feel that the future may hold a policy of compulsory rotation of
C.P.A. firms among clients? Yes_______No_________
1/. Do you feel that such a policy would increase an auditor's independence, which is
a primary ethical consideration in the accounting profession? Yes No
4
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18. Do you feel that such a policy would cause an auditor to be more objective in his 
dealings with clients? Yes_______ No________
19. How do you feel about a policy of rotating auditing firms among clients on a routine 
b asis?
20. Please use the remainder of this page to make any further comrtents.
Return to: Mrs. Sarah C. Dawkins, Department of Accountancy, Roan 200, College of Business
Administration, Menphis State University, Menphis, Tennessee 33152
<
APPENDIX B
The Fortune 500
Appendix B contains a list of the largest United 
States industrial companies. The controller of each of 
these 500 companies received a questionnaire, an example 
of which is presented in Appendix A.
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FORTUNE'S 500
Largest U. S. Industrial Corporations
ACF Industries, Inc.
A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.
AMAX, Inc.
AMF, Inc.
AMP, Inc.
A. 0. Smith Corp.
A-T-0, Inc.
Abbott Laboratories 
Addressograph Multigraph Corp. 
Adolph Coors 
Agway, Inc.
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 
Airco, Inc.
Akzona, Inc.
Alco Standard Corp.
Allegheny Ludlum Industries 
Allied Chemical Corp. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp.
Alumax, Inc.
Aluminum Company of America 
Amerada Hess Corp.
American Bakeries Co.
American Beef Packers 
American Brands, Inc.
American Broadcasting Companies 
American Can Co.
American Chain & Cable Corp. 
American Cyanamid Co.
American Hoist & Derrick Co. 
American Home Products Corp. 
American Motors Corp.
American Petrofina Corp. 
American Standard, Inc.
Amstar Corp.
Amsted Industries, Inc.
Amtel, Inc.
Anaconda Co.
Anchor Hocking Corp.
Anderson, Clayton & Co. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.
Armco
Armstrong Cork Co.
Arvin Industries, Inc. 
Asarco, Inc.
Ashland Oil, Inc. 
Associated Milk Producers 
Atlantic Richfield Co.
Avco Corp.
Avnet, Inc.
Avon Products, Inc.
B. F. Goodrich Co.
Babcock & Wiley Co., Inc. 
Baker International Corp. 
Ball Corp.
Bausch and Lomb, Inc. 
Baxter Travenol Labs. 
Beatrice Foods Co.
Becton, Dickinson & Co. 
Belco Petroleum Corp.
Bell & Howell Co.
Bemis Co., Inc.
Bendix Corp.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Black & Decker Mfg. Corp. 
Blue Bell, Inc.
Bluebird, Inc.
Boeing Co.
Boise Cascade Corp.
Borden, Inc.
Borg-Warner Corp.
Briggs & Stratton Corp. 
Bristol-Myers Co.
Brockway Glass Co.
Brown Group, Inc.
Brunswick Corp. 
Bucyrun-Erie Co.
Budd Co.
Burlington Industries, Inc, 
Burroughs Corp.
CBS, Inc.
CF Industries, Inc.
CPC International 
Cabot Corp.
Cameron Iron Works, Inc. 
Campbell Soup Co„
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Campbell Taggert, Inc.
Cannon Mills Co.
Carborundum Co.
Carnation Co.
Carrier Corp.
Castle & Cooke, Inc. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
Celanese Corp.
Central Soya Co., Inc. 
Cerro-Marmon Corp.
Cessna Aircraft Co.
Certain-teed Corp.
Champion International Corp. 
Champion Spark Plug Co. 
Charter Co.
Chemetron Corp. 
Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc. 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 
Chromalloy American Corp. 
Chrysler Corp.
Cincinnati Milacron, Inc. 
Cities Service Co.
Clark Equipment Co.
Clark Oil & Refining Corp. 
Clorox Co.
Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc. 
Coca-Cola Co., Inc. 
Colgate-Palmolive 
Collins & Aikman Corp.
Colt Industries, Inc. 
Columbia Pictures Industries 
Combustion Engineering, Inc. 
Commonwealth Oil Refining 
Con-Agra, Inc.
Cone Mills Corp.
Congoleum Corp.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. 
Consolidated Foods Corp. 
Container Corp. of America 
Continental Group, Inc. 
Continental Oil Co.
Control Data Corp.
Cook Industries, Inc.
Cooper Industries 
Corning Glass Works, Inc. 
Crane Co.
Crown Central Petroleum 
Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. 
Crown Zellerbach
Cummins Engine Co., Inc. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp. 
Cutler-Hammer, Inc.
Cyclops Corp.
Cyprus Mines Corp.
Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.
Dan River, Inc.
Dana Corp.
Dart Industries, Inc.
Dayco Corp.
Deere & Co.
Del Monte Corp.
Diamond International Corp. 
Diamond Shamrock Corp.
Digital Equipment 
Dover Corp.
Dow Chemical Co.
Dresser Industries, Inc.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. 
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. 
Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc. 
Eastman Kodak Co.
Eaton Corp.
Economics Labs., Inc.
Eli Lilly & Co.
Eltra Corp.
Emerson Electric Co.
Emhart Corp.
Envirotech Corp.
Esmark, Inc.
Ethyl Corp.
Evans Products Co.
Ex-Cell-0 Corp.
Exxon Corp.
FMC Corp.
Fairmont Foods Co.
Farmland Industries, Inc. 
Federal Co.
Federal-Mogul Corp.
Federal Paper Board Co.
Ferro Corp.
Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
Flavorland Industries, Inc. 
Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. 
Flintkote Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Foster Wheeler Corp.
Foxboro Co.
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Fruehauf Corp.
Fuqua Industries, Inc.
GAF Corp.
GATX Corp.
G. D. Searle & Co.
Gannett Co., Inc.
Gardner-Denver Co.
General Cable Corp.
General Dynamics Corp.
General Electric Co.
General Foods Corp.
General Host Corp.
General Instrument Corp.
General Mills, Inc.
General Motors Corp.
General Refractories Co.
General Signal Corp.
General Tire & Rubber Co. 
Genesco, Inc.
George A. Hormel & Co. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Gerber Products Co.
Getty Oil Co.
Gillette Co.
Gold Kist, Inc.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
Gould, Inc.
Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. 
Great Western United Corp.
Green Giant Co.
Greyhound Corp.
Grumman Corp.
Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. 
Gulf Oil Corp.
H. H. Robertson Co.
H. J. Heinz Co.
H. P. Hood, Inc.
Hammermill Paper 
Handy & Harman 
Hanes Corp.
Hanna Mining Co.
Harnischfeger Corp.
Harris Corp.
Harsco Corp.
Hart Schaffner & Marx 
Hercules, Inc.
Hershey Foods 
Heublein, Inc.
Hewlett-Packard Co.
Hobart Corp.
Hoerner Waldorf Corp.
Honeywell, Inc.
Hoover Co.
Hughes Tool Co.
Hygrade Food Products Corp. 
Hyster Co.
IC Industries, Inc.
I-T-E Imperial
Idle Wild Foods, Inc.
Indian Head, Inc. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Inland Container Corp.
Inland Steel Co.
Inmont Corp.
Insilco Corp.
Interco, Inc.
Interlake, Inc.
International Bus. Machines 
International Harvester Co. 
International Minerals & Chem. 
International Multifoods Corp. 
International Paper Co. 
International Systems Controls 
International Tele. & Tele. 
Interstate Brands Corp.
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.
J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
Jim Walter Corp.
Johns-Manville Corp.
Johnson & Johnson 
Jonathan Logan, Inc.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons 
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.
Joy Manufacturing Co.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Kaiser Industries Corp. 
Kane-Miller Corp.
Kayser-Roth 
Kellogg Co.
Kellwood Co.
Kennecott Copper Corp. 
Kerr-McGee Corp.
Kewanee Industries, Inc. 
Keystone Consolidated Indus. 
Kimberly-Clark'Corp. 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 
Koehring Co.
Koppers Co., Inc.
Kraftco Corp.
LTV Corp.
Land O'Lakes, Inc.
Lear Siegler, Inc.
Lever Brothers Co.
Levi Strauss & Co.
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Libby, McNeill & Libby 
Libby-Owens-Ford Co.
Liggett & Myers 
Litton Industries, Inc. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Lone Star Industries, Inc. 
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. 
Lubrizol Corp. 
Lykes-Youngstown Corp.
MAPCO, Inc.
MBPXL Corp.
MCA, Inc.
M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. 
Macmillan, Inc.
Marathon Oil Co.
Martin Marietta Corp.
Masco Corp.
Mattel, Inc.
McConnel Douglas Corp. 
McGraw-Edison Co.
McGraw-Hill, Inc.
McLouth Steel Corp.
Mead Corp.
Merck & Co., Inc.
Midland-Ross Corp.
Miles Labs., Inc.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Mobil Oil Corp.
Mohasco
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 
Monsanto Co.
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. 
Motorola, Inc.
Murphy Oil Corp.
NCR Corp.
NL Industries, Inc.
NVF Co., Inc.
Nabisco, Inc.
Nalco Chemical Co.
Nashua Corp.
National Can Corp.
National Distillers & Chem. 
National Gypsum Co.
National Service Industries 
National Steel 
Newmont Mining Corp.
New York Times Co.
Norris Industries, Inc.
North American Philips Corp. 
Northrop Corp.
Northwest Industries, Inc.
Northwestern Steel & Wire 
Norton Co.
Norton Simon, Inc. 
Occidental Petroleum Co. 
Ogden Corp.
Oil Shale Corp.
Olin Corp.
Oscar Mayer & Co., Inc. 
Outboard Marine Corp. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Owens-Illinois, Inc.
PPG Industries, Inc.
Pabst Brewing Co.
Paccar, Inc.
Parker-Hannifen Corp. 
Peabody Coal Co.
Peabody Galion Corp.
Peavey Co.
PepsiCo, Inc.
Pennwalt Corp.
Pennzoil Co.
Perkin-Elmer Corp.
Pet, Inc.
Pfizer, Inc.
Phelps Dodge Corp.
Philip Morris, Inc.
Phillips Petroleum Co. 
Phillips-Van Heusen Corp. 
Pillsbury Co.
Pitney-Bowes, Inc.
Pittston Co.
Polaroid Corp.
Potlatch Corp.
Proctor & Gamble Co. 
Pullman, Inc.
Purex Corp.
Quaker Oats Co.
Questor Corp.
RCA Corp.
R. J. Reynolds Industries 
R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. 
Ralston Purina Co.
Rath Packing Co.
Raytheon Co.
Reliance Electric Co. 
Republic Steel Corp.
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. 
Revlon, Inc.
Reynolds Metals Co.
Rexnord, Inc. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
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Rischhold Chemicals, Inc. 
Riviana Foods, Inc.
Rockwell International Corp. 
Rohm & Haas Co.
Rohr Industries, Inc.
Roper Corp.
SCM Corp.
St. Joe Minerals Corp.
St. Regis Paper Co.
Savannah Foods & Indus.
Saxon Industries, Inc. 
Schering-Plough Corp.
Scott Paper Co.
Scoville Mfg. Co.
Seaboard Allied Milling Corp. 
Shelber-Globe Corp.
Shell Oil Co.
Sherwin-Williams Co.
Signal Co., Inc.
Signode Corp.
Simmons Co.
Singer Co.
SmithKline Corp.
Southwest Forest Industries 
Spencer Foods, Inc.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
Sperry Rand Corp.
Springs Mills, Inc.
Square D 
Squibb Corp.
Standard Brands, Inc.
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. 
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio) 
Stanley Works 
Stauffer Chemical Co.
Sterling Drug, Inc. 
Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc. 
Studebaker-Worthington, Inc. 
SuCrest Corp.
Sun Co., Inc.
Sunbeam Corp.
Sundstrand Corp.
Superior Oil Co., Inc.
Sybron Corp.
TRW, Inc.
Talley Industries, Inc. 
Tecumseh Products Co. 
Tektronix, Inc.
Teledyne, Inc.
Tenneco, Inc.
Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 
Texaco, Inc.
Texas Instruments, Inc. 
Texasgulf, Inc.
Textron, Inc.
Thiokol Corp.
Thomas J. Lipton, Inc.
Time, Inc.
Times Mirror Co.
Timken Co.
Trane Co.
Trans Union Corp.
Twentieth Century Fox Film 
USM Corp.
U. S. Gypsum Co.
U. S. Industries, Inc.
U. S. Steel Corp.
UV Industries, Inc.
Union Camp Corp.
Union Carbide Corp.
Union Oil Co. of Calif. 
Uniroyal, Inc.
United Brands Co.
United Merchants & Mfgs. 
United Refining Co.
United Technologies Corp. 
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. 
Upjohn Co.
Utah International, Inc.
VF Corp.
Varian Association 
Vulcan Materials Co.
W. R. Grace & Co. 
Wallace-Murray Corp.
Walter Kidde & Co., Inc. 
Ward Foods, Inc,
Warnaco, Inc.
Warner Communications, Inc. 
Warner-Lambert Co. 
Washington Post Co.
Wean United, Inc.
West Point-Pepperell, Inc. 
Western Electric Co., Inc. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
Westmoreland Coal Co. 
Westvaco Corp.
Weyerhaeuser Co. 
Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel 
Whirlpool Corp.
White Consolidated Indus.
White Motor Corporation 
Whittaker Corp.
Willamette Industries, Inc. 
William Wrigley, Jr., Co. 
Williams Companies 
Witco Chemical Corp.
Xerox Corp.
Zenith Radio Corp.
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Sarah Elisabeth Tourne Crais, the daughter of Mrs. 
Josette Tourne Crais, and the late Mr. Stewart Martin 
Crais, was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, on September 7, 
1946. She received her elementary and secondary education 
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born.
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phy in the Department of Accounting.
Candidate: 
Major Field: 
Title of Thesis:
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT
Sarah Elisabeth Tourne Crais Dawkins 
Accounting
An Inquiry Concerning The Selection, Rotation, and Retention 
of Independent Auditors
Approved:
M a jo r  P ro fe s s o r  an d  C h a irm a n
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
X^). XXX.
XX
Date of Examination: 
December 1, 1978
